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ABSTRACT 
 
The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long 
assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for ways to express 
a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Workers are agitating for 
greater voice at their workplaces. And prominent legislators have recently 
proposed corporate law reforms that would put a sizable number of employee 
representatives on the boards of directors of large public companies. These 
rumblings of public discontent are echoed in recent corporate law scholarship, 
which has cataloged the costs of shareholder control, touted the advantages of 
nonvoting stock, and questioned whether activist holders of various stripes are 
acting in the company’s best interests. Academics who support stronger 
shareholder rights are accused of pandering to special interest groups or 
naively seeking a panacea in a plebiscite.  
 
As critical theorists have documented over time, the foundations of the 
shareholder primacy model have always been compromised. In particular, the 
arguments for a core feature of the modern corporation—the exclusive 
shareholder franchise—have been revealed as the product of flawed 
assumptions, misapplied social choice theory, and a failure to hold true to the 
fundamental precepts of standard economics. It is time to look at such 
governance features anew, and reorient the literature around the basic purpose 
of corporations: to provide a legal mechanism for business firms to engage in 
the process of joint production.  
 
In this article, we present a new shared governance model, one that builds 
on the longstanding theory of the firm as well as a novel theory of democratic 
participation. These twin arguments, economic and political, both counsel in 
favor of extending the corporate franchise to employees as well as shareholders, 
and, importantly, provide a way to distinguish these two constituencies from 
other corporate stakeholders when it comes to governance rights. We conclude 
by assessing the current status of a shared governance system in Germany and 
advocating for further theoretical and empirical inquiry into organizational 
governance structures that provide for joint shareholder and employee 
participation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a remarkable moment in corporate law. Everything is about to change. 
The status quo of shareholder primacy clings stubbornly on, full of its old power 
in appearance, and yet it is a façade. It is the Soviet Union after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. It is Persia after Thermopylae, the British Raj after the Salt March, 
disco after the Ramones. We are at the beginning of the end. 
This claim may seem absurd in light of the dominance of shareholder 
primacy theory throughout the United States, the European Union, and 
developing nations. The academic network behind shareholder primacy remains 
resolute; almost all corporate law scholarship pivots around the central idea of 
shareholder control.1 It is almost twenty years since Henry Hansmann and 
Reinier Kraakman’s declaration about the end of corporate law history,2 and 
shareholder wealth maximization remains the governing norm.  
But underneath the superficial agreement is a roiling mass of disputes and 
divisions. The field is more fractured than ever before. The prospect of real 
shareholder empowerment, through proxy access or shareholder bylaws, has 
split the academy into subgroups that advocate for divergent approaches.3 
Activist investors have gone from the saviors of shareholder rights4 to short-term 
 
1 Ann M. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. CORP. L. 297, 300 (2019) (“Most 
modern theories of the corporation subscribe to what is known as ‘shareholder 
primacy,’ i.e., the notion that directors have, or should have, a commitment to manage 
the corporation in a manner that benefits the shareholders.”). 
2 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view 
that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”). 
3 See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 1, at 300 (discussing “sharply divergent views of the 
precise nature of directors’ legal obligations”). The Bainbridge-Bebchuk debate over 
the role of shareholder participation in management is one example. Compare Lucian 
A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 835 
(2005) (arguing that shareholders should have increased governance power), with 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (advocating for a director primacy 
model). 
4 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge 
Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2015) (noting research in finance that 
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opportunists who should be marginalized.5 Money is being shoveled like never 
before into passive index funds and exchange-traded funds—the absentee 
landlords of stock ownership.6 Important recent scholarship focuses on the 
problems of “principal costs” generated by investor governance7 and touts the 
advantages of nonvoting shares.8 Leaders in the field such as Nobel Laureate 
Oliver Hart,9 Michael Jensen,10 and Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine11 are 
 
“public disclosures of the purchase of a significant stake by an activist are accompanied 
by significant positive stock-price reactions as well as followed by subsequent 
improvements in operating performance”); Mark Hulbert, A Good Word for Hedge 
Fund Activism, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/business/yourmoney/18stra.html. 
5 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood 
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 
126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1874 (2017) (discussing the dangers of hedge-fund activism); 
James B. Stewart, Hedge Funds Should Be Thriving Right Now. They Aren’t., N.Y. 
TIMES (July 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/business/hedge-
funds.html. 
6 See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. 
L. 493, 494 (2018) (noting that millions of investors have moved their money from 
actively managed mutual funds to passively managed funds); Bryan Borzykowski, The 
trillion-dollar ETF boom triggered by the financial crisis just keeps getting bigger, 
CNBC.COM, Sept. 14, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/the-trillion-dollar-etf-
boom-triggered-by-the-financial-crisis.html (“In 2008, U.S. investors had $531 billion 
in ETFs; that’s jumped to more than $3.4 trillion today, according to Statistica.”). 
7 Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law 
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 770 (2017). 
8 Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN. 
L. REV. 687, 694-700 (2019). 
9 Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not 
Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN & ACCT. 247, 248 (2017). 
10 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2010, at 32, 33 (arguing that 
corporations should pursue “maximization of the long-run value of the firm” rather than 
shareholder wealth maximization). 
11 Leo E. Strine Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive 
Proposal to Help American Workers, Restore Fair Gainsharing Between Employees and 
Shareholders, and Increase American Competitiveness by Reorienting Our Corporate 
Governance System Toward Sustainable Long-Term Growth and Encouraging 
Investments in America’s Future (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion 
Paper No. 1018, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924 
(opining that “[t]he incentive system for the governance of American corporations has 
failed in recent decades to adequately encourage long-term investment, sustainable 
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questioning the stability of shareholder primacy as a regulatory norm. The 
corporate-law centre cannot hold. 
Now that shareholder primacy is losing its grip on the corporate world, for 
the first time in a very long time we can start to see the outlines of what will 
come after. The next wave in corporate governance is coming, and it will include 
workers. For too long, labor has been left outside of the corporate governance 
gates. But we now see concrete examples of the coming change. Recent bills 
proposed by Senators Tammy Baldwin and Elizabeth Warren provide workers 
with representation on the board of directors.12 The Walkout for Change by 
Google workers demanded, in part, the appointment of an employee 
representative to Google’s board.13 The German system of codetermination, 
where workers elect up to half the members of the corporate supervisory board, 
showed its strength and resilience in the recovery from the global economic 
crisis.14 And new managerial methodologies providing for participatory 
management and employee voice are increasingly popular around the globe.15 
Policymakers, workers’ advocates, and workers themselves are looking anew at 
the corporate structure and asking why workers have been left out. 
 Despite these murmurings of fundamental change, corporations have more 
legal and economic power than ever before. Over the last decade, corporate 
profits have hovered between nine and eleven percent of the U.S. gross domestic 
 
business practices, and most importantly, fair gainsharing between shareholders and 
workers.”); Hon. Leo E. Strine, Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional 
Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate 
Political Spending, Working Paper, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3304611 (arguing that “Worker 
Investors” have different interests than purely financial investors and that fund 
managers have a fiduciary duty to represent these hybrid interests when exercising the 
voting power of the shares).  
12 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work Act, S. 
2605, 115th Cong. (2018). 
13 Noam Scheiber, Google Workers Reject Silicon Valley Individualism in Walkout, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/business/google-
employee-walkout-labor.html. 
14 See Part IV.C infra. 
15 See, e.g., FREDERIC LALOUX, REINVENTING ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE TO 
CREATING ORGANIZATIONS INSPIRED BY THE NEXT STAGE OF HUMAN 
CONSCIOUSNESS (2014); BRIAN J. ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: THE NEW 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD (2015). 
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product—the highest sustained average percentage on record.16 Recent tax 
changes have dramatically slashed corporate tax bills and returned billions of 
dollars to corporate coffers.17 And the power of the corporate form continues to 
expand. By providing corporations with individualized constitutional and 
statutory rights of expression, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens 
United18 and Hobby Lobby19 have extended the corporation’s powers even more 
deeply into politics, religion, and culture. 
Within the corporation, the shareholder franchise has long been the critical 
control feature. No other group of corporate constituents—employees, 
bondholders, customers, or suppliers—possesses anything close to this level of 
control over firm decisions. The justifications for this exclusivity are well worn 
at this point, even if they remain somewhat slippery. One model describes the 
corporation as a nexus of freely bargained contracts, and therefore 
presumptively the most efficient way to structure firm governance.20 Another 
justification is that shareholders are owners of the corporate residual, and they 
 
16 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, Corporate Profits After Tax 
(without IVA and CCAdj)/Gross Domestic Product, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1Pik; see also Tim Worstall, Why Have Corporate 
Profits Been Rising as a Percentage Of GDP? Globalisation, FORBES, May 7, 2013, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/05/07/why-have-corporate-profits-
been-rising-as-a-percentage-of-gdp-globalisation/#6a27a3fb2a6e. At the same time, 
workers’ wages and salaries have reached their lowest percentage of GDP. Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, Compensation of Employees: Wages 
and Salary Accruals/Gross Domestic Product, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=2Xa; 
Michael Madowitz & Seth Hanlon, GDP Is Growing, but Workers’ Wages Aren’t, 
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, July 26, 2018, 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2018/07/26/454087/gdp-
growing-workers-wages-arent/. 
17 An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent 
Resolution on the Budget for the Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C) (known as the “Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017”) (cutting the corporate tax rate from 35% to 20%). 
18 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
19 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
20 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA 
L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) (“The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is the 
so-called nexus of contracts theory.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) (“The corporation is a 
complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate law enables the participants 
to select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of risks and opportunities 
that are available in a large economy.”). 
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have the appropriate incentives to make good firm decisions.21 Rights to the 
residual provide shareholders with a common interest in maximizing corporate 
profits, which reduces their tendency to squabble about firm decisions and 
allegedly eliminates the possibility of having voting cycles infect board 
elections.22 Scholars who believe in shareholder wealth maximization but 
nevertheless believe in centralized board authority have tinkered around the 
edges of these standard economic accounts by emphasizing the importance of 
board or managerial discretion.23  
But these traditional arguments for the shareholder franchise are falling 
apart—not just from criticisms by outsiders, but through conflicts from inside 
the house. It is well-recognized now that shareholders across the board have 
heterogeneous, rather than homogenous, interests that diverge along a number 
of dimensions.24 Scholars are losing trust in shareholders with significant 
power,25 and there is even support for nonvoting shares and passive 
shareholding.26 Those academics who support strengthened shareholder power 
 
21 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 67-68 (1991) (justifying the corporate franchise based on 
shareholders’ interests in the residual) 
22 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 405 (1983) (discussing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND 
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963)). 
23 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3. 
24 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 791 (describing “several sources of conflict 
among shareholders, including differing investment horizons and needs for cash 
payouts, empty voting, and competing outside interests”); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew 
T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 505 (2008) (“It is becoming increasingly clear, for example, 
that shareholders have many different types of interests in a corporation.”). 
25 Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2008) (“[A]ctivist shareholders are using their growing influence 
not to improve overall firm performance, as has generally been assumed, but to profit 
at other shareholders’ expense.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and 
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1750 (2006) (“[S]hareholder 
voting is properly understood not as a primary component of the corporate 
decisionmaking structure, but rather as an accountability device of last resort, to be used 
sparingly, at most.”). 
26 Lund, supra note 8, at 697-98; Lund, supra note 6, at 497 (arguing that passive funds 
should not have voting rights). 
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are accused of supporting special interests and shadow agendas.27 The house of 
the exclusive shareholder franchise is collapsing in on itself. 
With the standard economic approaches on the ropes, we’d expect to see 
alternatives rise to fill the gaps in corporate governance theory. But there is a 
dearth of such alternatives. Most progressive scholars have to this point have left 
the shareholder franchise alone and cross their fingers for more ecumenical firm 
decisionmaking.28 Stakeholder advocates have not put forth convincing 
theoretical distinctions among constituencies that might tell us which group 
preferences are best captured by governance and which by contract.29 The 
growth of B-Corps and benefit corporations has created a parallel corporate 
ecosystem outside of the traditional one where shareholder primacy can been 
watered down or diminished—but not replaced.30 Even those who dare to dream 
 
27 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 1754 (claiming that Lucian Bebchuk’s 
argument for shareholder empowerment would help “precisely the institutions most 
likely to use their position to self-deal--that is, to take a non-pro rata share of the firm's 
assets and earnings--or otherwise to reap private benefits not shared with other 
investors”); Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A 
Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 451 (2014) (“Bebchuk is the sincere champion of one group of 
‘agents’ wielding power and authority over others’ money—the money managers who 
control most of the investments belonging ultimately to ordinary Americans who are 
saving to pay for their retirements and for their children’s education—against another 
group of ‘agents’ that he believes is somehow more conflicted--the agents who actually 
manage corporations that make real products and deliver useful services (i.e. 
‘productive corporations’).”). 
28 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 290-91 (1999) (describing directors as trustees for 
stakeholders). 
29 Kent Greenfield has come the closest to proposing a redesigned board of directors, 
but he did not lay out specifics. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 112 
(2006) (“The specifics will be difficult but not impossible: employees could elect a 
proportion of the board; communities in which the company employs a significant 
percentage of the workforce could be asked to propose a representative to the board; 
long-term business partners and creditors could be represented as well.”). 
30 Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 
682 (2013) (“Enthusiasts argue social enterprises will have a more positive and 
sustainable impact on people and planet than ordinary for-profit businesses.”); Heerad 
Sabeti, The For-Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2011, at 98. 
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big have—up to now—checked their expectations at the door.31 Forces are 
amassing but still scattered and diffuse. 
The reconstruction of corporate governance theory, at minimum, needs to 
reassess which stakeholders should have their preferences captured through the 
most powerful feature of corporate control—voting—and, just as importantly, 
which should not. To answer this question, we will return to the theory of the 
firm and reconsider the purposes of corporations and what that means for 
governance. We will also develop a new theory of democratic participation 
designed to assess which interested parties should have their preferences 
captured through an electoral process. Both of these theories—the economic 
theory of the firm and the political theory of democratic participation—support 
a model that incorporates employees expressly into the inner sanctum of 
corporate governance. And both of these theories also give us the tools to 
distinguish between insiders—shareholders and employees—and other 
stakeholders whose interests in a typical corporation are best captured in ways 
other than voting rights.  
In sum, this article catalogs the main shortcomings of existent corporate 
governance theory and proposes a shared governance model of the firm to 
replace it. We begin, in Part II, by recounting the intellectual foundations of the 
shareholder primacy norm that dominates current corporate law scholarship. In 
doing so, we will focus on the core feature of that norm—the exclusive 
shareholder franchise—and the arguments put forth in support of it. These 
arguments have a range of problems: they are based on a number of faulty 
empirical assumptions; they misapply basic economic and social choice theory; 
and, in the end, they often rely on a bit wishful thinking on the part of legal 
scholars determined to paper over the cracks in their theories. This has left the 
scholarly case for shareholder voting—most of which comes out of the law-and-
economics tradition—on the verge of collapse.  
In the central sections of the article, we develop a theory of shared corporate 
governance. In Part III, we begin to reconstruct corporate governance 
scholarship by returning to and reinvigorating the longstanding theory of the 
firm. This theory, born out of a desire to explain why business firms exist apart 
from markets in the first place, is not only consistent with but actually militates 
in favor of greater employee participation in corporate governance. As 
 
31 Brett H. McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429, 442 (2011) (stating that “large legal changes that would 
strongly encourage or mandate significant employee involvement [in corporate 
governance] are politically quite unlikely to succeed”). 
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participants in joint production, those employees should also have voting rights 
within the firm. In Part IV, we develop a new theory of democratic participation 
that helps explain which corporate constituents should be extended the corporate 
franchise rights (and, just as importantly, which should not). This theory, fully 
consistent with mainstream democratic theory and informed by voting rights 
jurisprudence, also counsels in favor of extending voting rights to employees in 
ordinary corporate governance situations. We will also examine the example of 
German codetermination as an empirical proof of concept. In the end, the 
economic theory of the firm and the democratic theory of participation provide 
the foundation for a new vision of corporate governance, one that includes 
workers and shareholders, labor and equity, for the benefit of all corporate 
stakeholders. 
 
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
A.   Shareholder Primacy and the Exclusive Franchise 
 Shareholder primacy, a version of corporate governance that assigns 
priority to shareholder interests above all others, has been the consensus 
governance model in corporate law for at least thirty years, and arguably for over 
a century.32 The exclusive right of shareholders to elect the board of directors 
has been around even longer, dating back to the proliferation of corporations in 
the nineteenth century.33 But while corporate law currently embodies both of 
these governing principles, they are not necessary components of the corporate 
form.  
Under our federalized system, corporations are creatures of state corporate 
law. Even though state corporate law allows for a great deal of organizational 
flexibility, actual governance structures are remarkably uniform. Delaware 
corporate law, for example, does not even require a corporation to have a 
 
32 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A2d 345, 360 (Del 1993) (“(D)irectors are 
charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the corporation and 
to act in the best interests of its shareholders.”). See also E. Norman Veasey, Should 
Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices--or 
Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. Rev. 2179, 2184 (2001) (stating that Delaware law adopts 
the norm of shareholder primacy). 
33 See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the 
History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1351-53 (2006) 
(noting that shareholders have had voting power extending back to the earliest of 
corporations).  
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board,34 and yet all corporations have them. The board controls the firm and has 
the ability to legally bind the corporation to its decisions.35 Shareholders elect 
the directors at the annual shareholders meeting by in-person voting or the use 
of proxies.36 Directors must act in the corporation’s interests and are bound by 
certain fiduciary duties, primarily good faith, care, and loyalty.37 However, 
directors generally delegate the actual job of running the business to the officers, 
primarily through a hierarchy of employees headed by the chief executive officer 
(CEO).38 This structure—shareholders elect the directors, who in turn select the 
officers to run the corporation—replicates itself in corporations from every state. 
And the critical feature of corporate governance control—who gets to vote, 
about what, and under what circumstances—has also been fixed: the corporate 
franchise belongs to shareholders and shareholders alone. 
Shareholders have held the right to vote within the corporation since its 
inception.39 Although shareholder primacy has its roots in the early case of 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,40 it did not achieve full flower until the law and 
economics movement in corporate law, combined with the advantageous tax 
treatment of stock options.41 By the mid-2000s, the shareholder primacy norm 
oriented not only academic theory but also boardroom practice. 
 
34 Id. § 141. 
35 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1)–(2). 
36 Id. § 211(b). 
37 Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 86 (Claire Hill & Brett 
McDonnell eds., 2012). 
38 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (“Every corporation organized under this 
chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the 
bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors which is not inconsistent with the 
bylaws . . . .”). 
39 Dunlavy, supra note 33, at 1351-53. 
40 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
41 Shareholder primacy proponents touted the importance of stock-oriented 
performance incentives for management to provide the proper incentives. See, e.g., 
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, 
But How, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990). In 1993, the tax code was amended to 
prohibit the deduction of executive compensation over $1,000,000 unless it was 
performance-based. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2012). See Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling 
Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 879 
(2007) (“The purpose of this legislation was to enhance shareholder wealth in two ways: 
by reducing the overall level of executive compensation and by influencing the 
composition of executive compensation arrangements in favor of components that were 
more sensitive to firm performance.”). The end result was a dramatic increase in the use 
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The classic justification for the shareholder franchise is that shareholders 
are the “owners” of the corporation and therefore should have the right to control 
it.42 The law and economics justification has centered around the shareholder’s 
right to the “residual”—namely, the residual profits remaining after all other 
claimants have been paid.43 Because they are paid “last,” the argument goes, 
they have the best set of incentives for governing the company.44 Along with the 
shareholder primacy norm, the “nexus of contracts” theory of the corporation is 
also popular in economics and legal academic circles.45 Under this theory, the 
corporation does not really exist and instead should best be considered as cluster 
of contractual agreements among a variety of parties. The nexus of contracts 
approach counsels for a “hands-off” or default-rule approach to corporate law, 
as the corporation is conceived as a set of voluntarily-chosen relationships 
between different parties.46 
In their foundational work on the law and economics of corporate law, 
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel married these two theories into a simple, 
intertwined structure. Their book, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law,47 
reaffirmed the shareholder primacy norm by arguing that shareholders are the 
most economically vulnerable of the firm’s participants. This vulnerability, 
coupled with their shared preference for wealth maximization, means that 
shareholders should be accorded the basic governance rights of the 
 
of stock options in executive compensation. Id. at 906 (“It is widely believed that § 
162(m) contributed significantly to the explosion of compensatory stock options that 
began in the late 1990s.”). 
42 Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1189, 1190-92 (2002). This is one of the “bad” arguments. Id. 
43 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 67 (“The reason [that shareholders vote] 
is that the shareholders are the residual claimants to the firm’s income.”). 
44 See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 21 (1995) (“Because shareholders 
are in this residual claim position, most economists argue that they have the greatest 
incentive to see that the company makes good business decisions and uses its assets 
wisely to earn profits.”). 
45 See generally Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Voting and the 
Symbolic Politics of Corporation as Contract, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511 (2018).  
46 Cf. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 
84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (developing the “triviality hypothesis”—namely, 
that “appearances notwithstanding, state corporate law is trivial: it does not prevent 
companies—managers and investors together—from establishing any set of governance 
rules they want”). 
47 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 21. 
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corporation.48 Thus, Easterbrook and Fischel contended, the other participants 
in the corporation agreed, through their own contracts, to provide shareholders 
with residual rights to the corporation’s profits and the voting rights that come 
with them.49 The shareholder primacy norm provided the overriding purpose to 
the corporate form, while the nexus of contracts theory demonstrated how the 
parties have reached this arrangement through voluntary agreements. 
From this core law and economics framework have blossomed divergent 
approaches to some of the central corporate debates of the last twenty years. One 
group of theorists, most prominently Lucian Bebchuk, focused on providing 
shareholders with stronger legal powers within the corporation.50 Such powers 
include power over corporate political spending, the right to access the 
company’s proxy ballot, and a prohibition on staggered boards.51 Others, such 
as Steven Bainbridge’s director primacy theory52 and Margaret Blair and Lynn 
Stout’s team production theory,53 rallied around various versions of board 
primacy. While these board primacy scholars disagree with each other on the 
appropriate goals of the corporation, they all believe that a governance system 
that’s less responsive to shareholders will allow the board to make better 
decisions.54  
Significantly, all of these theorists, like Easterbrook and Fischel before 
them, are committed to corporate governance structures in which shareholders 
alone elect board members and vote on other matters of importance. The original 
justifications for the exclusive shareholder franchise, many of which are now 
more than four decades hold, continue to be cited, recited, and relied upon by 
the universe of scholars of corporate governance.55 
 
 
48 Id. at 67-68. 
49 Id. at 17, 37. 
50 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 3. 
51 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who 
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for 
Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
557 (2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The 
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and A Reply to 
Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2002) 
52 Bainbridge, supra note 3. 
53 Blair & Stout, supra note 28.  
54 See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious 
Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2089-92 (2010). 
55 Including us. 
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B. Cracks in the Foundational Arguments 
While Easterbrook and Fischel’s arguments for the shareholder franchise 
continue to hold sway, substantial cracks have appeared in their foundations. As 
we catalog these arguments and some of their shortcomings, it is important to 
realize that our critiques do not question the basic principles of standard 
economics or social choice theory thought to underlie them. Instead, we take 
those principles as given, and discuss their misapplication in the context of 
corporate governance. It’s our sense that corporate governance scholars often 
start from basic economic principles only to discard them when it they run into 
(what they perceive as) problems. These arguments, in other words, will be 
evaluated by the standards that their proponents set for themselves.  
 
1. The Contractarian Argument 
 One of the most basic arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise is 
that it, like any feature of corporate governance, is presumptively efficient 
because it is the product of freely bargained contracts.56 In this view, the 
corporation itself is nothing more a nexus of contracts.57 Although it often hard 
to tell whether the corporation as contract is intended to be a literal or 
metaphorical description, there is no doubt that it has done heavy rhetorical work 
in the service of the law and economics vision of the corporation. If all corporate 
constituents agree to a governance system in which shareholders alone have 
voting rights, who’s to say they’ve got it wrong?  
 Over time, even the most die-hard contractarians have conceded that this 
description of the corporation is not literally true—there are some key features 
 
56 This argument is given extensive treatment in Hayden & Bodie, supra note 45; Grant 
M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of 
Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2011); Michael Klausner, The 
Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779 
(2006); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of 
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 301 (1999); Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on 
Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (1989); William W. Bratton, Jr., 
The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 
(1989). 
57 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) 
(providing the original description of the theory); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, 
supra note 21, at 1-39 (providing one of the most prominent iterations of the theory). 
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to modern corporations that cannot be reduced to contract.58 The most prominent 
of these is the signature feature of the corporate form: limited liability.59 Limited 
liability cannot be replicated by contract, but is instead, a concession granted by 
the state to corporations in exchange for the ability to tax and regulate them in 
various ways.60 Corporations are not reducible to a set of contracts; indeed, if 
contracts were sufficient, then there would be no need for corporate law in the 
first place.61  
As corporate governance theorists shifted to using the nexus of contracts 
more metaphorically, their reliance on contract theory becomes somewhat self-
defeating.62 Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, argue that corporate law 
provides the “ideal” contract that most participants would themselves develop, 
saving the parties from the transaction costs of developing it on their own.63 This 
argument, though, proves too much, as the theory then assigns itself with the 
task of assigning preferences—something that economists are generally loath to 
do. Moreover, the preferences of these particular hypothetical constituents do 
not reflect the preferences of actual constituents, even the shareholders 
themselves. And there’s certainly no independent reason to think that the rest of 
the corporate constituents would agree on such particularized governance 
features like the exclusive shareholder franchise.64  
This contractarian theory of the corporation turns out to be based on 
idealized, fictionalized versions of shareholders and other corporate 
constituents. And these fictional constituents, by and large, just happen to agree 
with normative law and economics principles and the current structures of 
 
58 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 67-75 (2010) (describing the 
mandatory elements of the corporate structure); Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, 
and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 
1537 (1989) (“Admittedly, as a descriptive matter state corporation codes and other 
sources of law contain many mandatory terms that parties cannot contract around.... 
[T]o claim that contractarians would deny the existence of coercive legal rules is to 
accuse them of blindness or stupidity.”). 
59 See RIBSTEIN, supra note 58, at 79; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 1137-39. 
60 See RIBSTEIN, supra note 58, at 138; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 1138. 
61 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56 (“A corporation is not a contract.”). 
62 For a more complete description and critical evaluation of this move to metaphor to 
save the contraction position, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 45, at 538-46. 
63 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 1418 (discussing how “much of 
corporate law is designed to reduce the costs of aligning the interests of managers and 
investors”). 
64 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 45, at 539-41. 
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corporate governance.65 But their supposed approval of every contemporary 
feature of corporate governance is nothing more than Panglossian wish 
fulfillment on the part of their creators. In the end, this argument in favor of the 
exclusive shareholder franchise is both descriptively wrong and normatively 
hollow. 
 
2. The Residual Argument 
The principle that all shareholders have a similar interest in the corporate 
residual, the leftover operating profit after all the costs have been paid, has long 
been central to the idea of shareholder voting.66 Because maximizing the 
residual maximizes the return to shareholders while leaving all other 
constituents (like creditors, employees, and suppliers) contractually satisfied, 
under this theory shareholder control over a corporation will increase efficiency 
by maximizing residual profits.67  
According to shareholder primacy theory, shareholders are best positioned 
to be assigned the vote because they have relatively homogeneous interests in 
maximizing the residual. More specifically, they alone have a single-minded 
focus on corporate profits.68 Over the last couple of decades, however, this 
assumption of shareholder homogeneity has broken down.69 Many shareholders 
have interests in the firm that go beyond a simple desire to maximize the 
residual, including majority shareholders, shareholders with disproportionate 
voting rights, members of voting trusts, bribed shareholders, hedged 
shareholders, sovereign wealth funds, and employee and management 
shareholders.70 In each case, those shareholders have interests that may temper 
or override their shared interest in the residual. In addition, shareholder 
heterogeneity is not simply a matter of shareholders with discrete competing 
interests. There is also heterogeneity among otherwise similarly situated 
shareholders with respect to their definitions of wealth maximization—
 
65 See id. at 541-42. For a more extensive discussion of this idea, see Daniel J.H. 
Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: “For Whom is the Corporation Managed,” 
Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996). 
66 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 67-69. 
67 See id. at 35-39; 67-69. 
68 See id. at 69-70. 
69 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 791; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 505. 
70 See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 561, 574-92 (2006); Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 477-98. 
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shareholders, for example, with different time horizons or risk preferences.71 
Defined-benefit pension funds have a definition of wealth maximization that 
would lead to different outcomes than a hedge fund, or a flash trader. 
The recent importance of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
investing highlights another problem with shareholder primacy. As economists 
should recognize, shareholder wealth maximization is not the same thing as 
shareholder utility maximization. Shareholders do in fact value things other than 
profit maximization, and corporate governance should be structured to allow 
them to express their preferences on tradeoffs in corporate decisionmaking.72 
The recent surge in ESG investing provides tangible evidence of disparate 
shareholder interests, with these funds estimated to represent one-quarter of the 
funds under management—roughly $12 trillion.73 Surveys show that three-
quarters of Americans have an interest in sustainable investing—evidence that 
nonmaximizing investments may continue to grow.74 In fact, misguided notions 
that shareholder wealth maximization is a required investing strategy may be 
artificially propping up wealth maximization approaches.75 
Finally, it is simplistic to say that shareholders are the only ones with an 
interest in the long-term value of the corporation. Employees may receive more 
discrete and regular payments, but they too have an ongoing interest in the 
success of the operation. Assuming that employees are paid by “contracts” that 
 
71 See Anabtawi, supra note 70, at 579-83; Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 492-94. 
For a thoughtful review of the short-termism debate, see Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, 
Short-Termism and Long-Termism 12-21 (Va. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 2, 
2016). 
72 Hart & Zingales, supra note 9. 
73 See Mark Miller, Bit by Bit, Socially Conscious Investors Are Influencing 401(k)’s, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/business/esg-401k-
investing-retirement.html. 
74 See Paul Sullivan, Investing for Social Impact Is Complicated. Here Are 4 Ways to 
Simplify It., N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/your-
money/impact-investing-standards.html; see also Dieter Holger, What Generation Is 
Leading the Way in ESG Investing? You’ll Be Surprised., WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-generation-is-leading-the-way-in-esg-investing-
youll-be-surprised-11568167440 (noting that millennials have the highest percentage 
of interest in ESG investing, but that Gen X is catching up in interest and likely has 
more ESG assets under management). 
75 Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG 
Integration, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 731, 734-35 (2019) (“[D]ue to outdated 
understandings of ‘social investing,’ some decision makers still worry that any strategy 
that considers environmental or social impacts will breach their fiduciary duties.”). 
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are set in economic stone makes it easy to ignore that over time, the corporate 
power of shareholders puts workers at a significant bargaining disadvantage.76 
If shareholders alone elect the board, then the board will naturally favor the will 
of their electorate.77 This dynamic has played out over time: wages have 
remained stagnant despite a booming economy, while corporate profits have 
grown at a staggering rate.78 Employees may have some market power, but they 
also have firm-specific capital that cannot be moved, and they generate the value 
that the firm holds through its brand, trademark, and good will.79 Because 
shareholders control the company, they control the brand, the goodwill, the 
ongoing business. Combined with the at-will rule and the dramatic decline in 
union representation, employees have remarkably little power within the firm, 
despite their ongoing interest in the business. 
 
3. The Arrow’s Theorem Argument 
Shareholder heterogeneity also undercuts another fairly prominent 
argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise: the argument from Arrow’s 
theorem. Easterbrook and Fischel first raised concerns, based on Kenneth 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, that corporate constituents with heterogeneous 
preferences would be more likely to produce intransitive election results, or 
voting cycles.80 This, in turn, would lead firms to “self-destruct.”81 This 
 
76 BLAIR, supra note 44, at 256-57. 
77 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose II: An Encouragement for 
Future Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1165, 1177 (2017) (“The boards of these corporations did not view themselves as 
having any national loyalties or loyalties to other constituencies, they viewed 
themselves as elected officials in the republic of equity capital.”) 
78 See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data (NBER Working Paper No. 20625, 
2014), available at http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2014.pdf (discussing 
diverging income inequality); Floyd Norris, Corporate Profits Grow and Wages Slide, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/05/business/economy/corporate-profits-grow-ever-
larger-as-slice-of-economy-as-wages-slide.html (discussing the rise in corporate profits 
and fall of employee compensation). 
79 Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 363 (2009) (“The positive reputation associated with a 
trademark is due to the work of many persons associated with the firm owning that mark 
over time.”). 
80 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 69-70. 
81 Id. at 70. 
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argument has since been repeated by a wide range of law and economics 
corporate governance scholars.82  
As discussed earlier, shareholders actually have quite heterogeneous 
preferences with respect to corporate decisionmaking. But the Arrow’s theorem 
argument falls apart long before we get to the nature of shareholder preferences: 
it is based on a misguided application of the theorem from the start.83 First, even 
if shareholders agree on an underlying goal of wealth maximization, that does 
not mean they agree on the best strategies or board candidates to achieve that 
goal.84 Second, the argument ignores the enormous democratic cost of avoiding 
possible voting cycles: prohibiting interested parties from voting based upon 
their purported preferences.85 Third, the argument utterly fails to analyze the 
likelihood or cost of cyclical election outcomes in corporate elections, and under 
some fairly straightforward assumptions, both are likely to be very low or 
nonexistent.86 The argument from Arrow’s theorem for the exclusive 
shareholder franchise is not at all compelling. 
 
4. The Argument for Board Primacy 
Competing corporate law theories in the law and economics tradition 
sometimes offer more realistic stories about corporate law doctrine. But they 
also do little to question the underlying structures of corporate control.87 Stephen 
Bainbridge’s “director primacy” theory well describes the ambivalence of 
Delaware corporate law towards the relationship between shareholders and the 
board of directors.88 But his theory ultimately fails to explain why directors 
should be given relatively unchecked authority over the operation of the firm.89 
 
82 See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 41-42 (1996); Blair 
& Stout, supra note 28, at 257; Gregory K. Dow, The New Institutional Economics and 
Employment Regulation, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 57, 69 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997). 
83 For a critical evaluation of this argument, see Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, 
Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1219 
(2009). For a condensed version, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 45, at 524-30. 
84 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 83, at 1230-32.  
85 See id. at 1232-34. 
86 See id. at 1234-39. 
87 For an overview and critical evaluation of the various forms of board primacy theory, 
see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56. 
88 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and 
Practice (2008). 
89 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 2089-92. 
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Similarly, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s “team production” model accurately 
takes into account the many participants in the life of the corporation.90 
However, their model also leaves it to shareholder-elected board to somehow 
manage these relationships appropriately.91 
Whether they be “Platonic guardians” (Bainbridge)92 or “mediating 
hierarchs” (Blair and Stout),93 there are no governance structures in place to 
ensure that actual directors live up to the faith that these accounts place in their 
ability to manage the firm for all constituents. In both cases, the ultimate check 
on the board is left in the hands of the shareholders alone. And both simply rely 
on earlier law and economics argument to justify the retention of the exclusive 
shareholder franchise.94 Those committed to board primacy provide no 
independent arguments for this fundamental mechanism of corporate control. 
 
C. New Challenges for the Primacy Model 
 Along with the flaws in the traditional law and economics model for 
corporate law, there are new concerns about the tremendous weight placed on 
shareholders within the model: specifically, the idea of shareholder wealth 
maximization as the focus of the enterprise, as well as the ability of shareholders 
to handle their governance responsibilities. These developments provide 
additional momentum for rethinking corporate governance. 
 
1. A Return to Corporate Purpose 
Since the early twentieth century, the idea that a corporation has a particular 
“purpose” for itself has pretty much been a nonstarter. But corporate law 
originally required corporations to establish a specific purpose as part of the 
incorporation process.95 The purpose specified the nature of the business to be 
established and provided a sense of scope. In a real sense, the purpose 
 
90 See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 28. 
91 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 2089-91, 2112-20. 
92 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 560. 
93 Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 280. 
94 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 2101-2111. 
95 Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 554-55 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“At first, 
corporations could be formed under the general laws only for a limited number of 
purposes . . . .”). 
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established the legal boundaries of activities for participants within the firm.96 
The purpose requirement was enforced through a legal action based on ultra 
vires, or “beyond the powers.” Under this doctrine, shareholders could sue the 
corporation if it went beyond the scope of its purpose, as established in the 
charter.97 Because it limited the reach of corporate power to enumerated 
purposes, the ultra vires doctrine was “an important tool to protect the state’s 
interest in restricting the power and size of corporations and to protect the 
shareholders from managerial overreaching.”98  
As corporations became more commonplace and less attention was paid to 
the specific charters, the ultra vires doctrine began to break down. Although 
ultra vires prohibitions remain on the books in almost every state,99 corporations 
learned to have as broad a corporate purpose as possible.100 Today, even though 
corporations are allowed to have specific purposes, for-profit companies 
generally follow specific language: the corporation is formed to conduct and 
transact all lawful business activities allowed under the laws of the state.101 The 
goal of shareholder wealth maximization became de rigueur at all 
corporations.102  
 
96 JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 60 (Arno Press Inc. 1972) (“[T]he general powers of a 
corporate body must be restricted by the nature and object of its institution.”). 
97 Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, A Prod, and A Big Stick: An 
Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as 
Methods for Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 929, 930 (2005) 
(“The ultra vires doctrine historically allowed a shareholder to sue to prevent a company 
from engaging in an activity outside of the specific parameters of its corporate 
charter.”). 
98 Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality 
(with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. 
L. REV. 1279, 1302 (2001). 
99 Sulkowsi & Greenfield, supra note 97, at 945 (“The incorporation statutes of forty-
nine states allow these states to dissolve a corporation or enjoin it from engaging in ultra 
vires activities--that is, activities outside of the corporation’s authority.”). 
100 See, e.g., Recent Cases, Corporations - Ultra Vires: What Acts Are Ultra Vires - Ill-
Defined Objects of Incorporation, 32 HARV. L. REV. 285, 290 (1919) (discussing a 
corporate purpose “enabling the company to carry on almost every conceivable kind of 
business which such an organization could adopt”). 
101 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held 
U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 618 (2017). 
102 Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
2003, 2004 (2013) (“Many, and possibly most, public companies now embrace a 
shareholder-centered vision of good corporate governance that emphasizes 
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However, there is a growing sense that corporations should have goals that 
go beyond merely the creation of wealth for equity holders. Some scholars 
propose refocusing the aims of the corporation largely within existing legal 
structures. Ronald Colombo, for example, suggests that corporate directors 
exercise their agency obligations on behalf of the shareholder owners in a way 
consistent with an Aristotelian understanding of ownership—one that that takes 
account of the common good and, by implication, the interests of other 
stakeholders.103 Other approaches involve the creation of new legal structures 
for the expression of these goals. One example is the growth of business 
organizations tailored to include socially beneficial purposes. Benefit 
corporations are a form of business organization created by state statutes to 
promote a more socially-responsible orientation within the business.104 The 
signal change from corporation to benefit corporation is its rejection of the 
shareholder primacy norm for a more socially-beneficial corporate purpose. This 
purpose must fit within the rubric of “social benefit” as defined by the state 
 
‘maximizing shareholder value’ (typically measured by share price) over all other 
corporate goals.”). See also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 
(Del. Ch. 2010) (“Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are 
bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards 
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders.”). 
103 See Ronald J. Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional and 
Progressive Corporate Law via an Aristotelian Understanding of Ownership, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 247 (2008); see also Susan J. Stabile, The Catholic Vision of the Corporation, 
4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 181, 186 (2005) (arguing for a corporate purpose that takes 
account of human dignity as grounded in Catholic social thought). Without proposing 
any real changes in the legal regime, however, it’s difficult to see how these attitude 
changes would be accomplished.  
104 See Matthew J. Dulac, Sustaining the Sustainable Corporation: Benefit 
Corporations and the Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L.J. 171, 175 (2015) (“A 
benefit corporation is a for-profit corporation with a stated public benefit that operates 
in a responsible and sustainable manner; in other words, it pursues the dual mission of 
making a profit and achieving some social good.”). See Brett McDonnell, Benefit 
Corporations and Strategic Action Fields or (The Existential Failing of Delaware), 39 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 280 (2016) (“State statutes legally define benefit corporations. 
These statutes sit atop the basic business corporation statute. That is, benefit 
corporations are business corporations, subject to all of the rules of the business 
corporation statute, except insofar as the benefit corporation statute provides different 
or additional rules.”). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307
 
 
 
24                                                      LAW REVIEW                                             [Vol. 100 
 
statute. Although most states provide a relatively broad definition,105 state 
benefit corporation law usually includes some mechanisms for enforcing the 
“benefit” component, such as benefit reporting, a benefit officer, fiduciary duties 
related to the benefit, or ultra vires actions if the purpose is ignored.106  
 Traditionally-organized companies are also feeling pressure to adopt 
purposes and principles beyond maximizing shareholder wealth. There is, of 
course, the possibility that such efforts are primarily for public relations.107 But 
there seems to be an increasing interest in authentic efforts to make a business 
about more than simply making money. At companies that follow participatory 
or self-managed internal governance, the purpose of the organization becomes 
the core around which the organization operates.108 Corporate social 
responsibility experts argue that the principles and purpose should be baked into 
the corporation’s everyday operations.109 Focusing on a purpose above and 
beyond shareholder wealth challenges the driving spirit of shareholder primacy. 
 
2.  Principal Costs & Shareholder Disengagement 
Dual-class voting structures at such tech titans as Facebook and Google, as 
well as the previously untested waters of nonvoting shares as distributed in by 
Snap, Inc., have raised anew the wisdom of deviating from the traditional one-
share, one-vote paradigm.110 Traditionally, corporate governance advocates 
have seen the one share, one vote paradigm as inviolate, and have pressured 
 
105 Delaware defines public benefit as “a positive effect (or reduction of negative 
effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other 
than stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited to, 
effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, 
literary, medical, religious, scientific or technological nature.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 362 (2016). 
106 Heminway, supra note 101, at 618. 
107 See Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 
983, 985 (2011) (identifying the problem of “faux CSR”). 
108 See Matthew T. Bodie, Holacracy and the Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619, 635 (2018). 
109 V. Kasturi Rangan, Lisa Chase & Sohel Karim, The Truth about Investors, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/01/the-truth-about-csr (contending that 
the main goal of CSR practices should be “to align a company’s social and 
environmental activities with its business purpose and values”). 
110 Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap’s Plan Is Most Unfriendly to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/snap-ipo-
plan-evan-spiegel.html. 
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companies to eschew dual-class or non-voting share structures. However, there 
has been a recent and somewhat surprising trend towards a theoretical 
justification for deviations from the one-share, one-vote scheme.  
It is no accident that these arguments come at a time when investments in 
massive, passive index funds is increasing apace.111 Index funds exist solely to 
own shares to an established set of financially successful companies while 
charging fees that are as low as possible. Any effort to investigate the issues at 
play in any particular election, or—in extreme circumstances—to run and fund 
a proxy challenge to incumbent directors, will cost the fund’s participants while 
providing benefits to participants in the other index funds, who spend nothing.112 
Such activity will redound to the detriment of the particular fund, as all funds 
get the benefit but only the particular fund incurs the cost.113 In a world where 
the index sets the investment portfolio, funds compete on cost, and every extra 
analyst becomes an unnecessary luxury.  
The extraordinary growth of index funds causes substantial problems to a 
corporate governance model based on the shareholder franchise. Voting rights 
require information to be meaningful. If a voter is not informed on the choice at 
hand, the voter will not make a rational choice. Either the voter will still vote, 
introducing whimsy and capriciousness into the process, or the voter will 
abstain. Neither option is effective if the system is built on informed choice and 
the resulting market discipline. 
In response to these funds with large masses of insensate stock holdings, 
corporate law scholars have pushed back against the assumptions of the 
traditional law and economic model. In developing their theory of “principal 
costs,” Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire argue that the field has been too 
focused on agency costs—namely, the inefficiencies generated by the delegation 
of control from shareholders to directors and managers.114 They point out that 
shareholder governance decisions can lead to “competence costs,” arising from 
lack of information or talent, and “conflict costs,” relating to the conflicts 
between different goals within the shareholder group.115 Shareholders delegate 
 
111 Lund, supra note 6, at 494. 
112 Id. at 495. 
113 Id.  
114 Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 769 (using the term “agency-cost essentialists” 
for scholars who “treat the reduction of agency costs as the essential function of 
corporate law”). 
115 Id. at 770-71. 
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their governance authority to management in order to address these costs.116 In 
particular, shareholder competence costs grow as shareholders become less 
knowledgeable about the corporation and its leadership. The problem of ignorant 
equity holders is so severe in Dorothy Lund’s view that she argues for regulatory 
restrictions on voting rights for large, passive funds.117 Excluding their shares 
from the voting pool will give a larger role to more informed and deserving 
shareholders.118 If voting rights are useless or restricted, then shareholders may 
begin to question their value. Nonvoting shares—an unspeakable taboo for 
modern corporate law—may actually be a better deal if shareholders do not have 
the information sufficient to translate their preferences into voting choices.119  
These new approaches deeply unsettle shared premises of modern corporate 
law theory. And they do so working within the shared normative framework of 
shareholder primacy. One might expect that at least some scholars would have 
proposed even more radical deviations from settled corporate law doctrine. Alas, 
thus far, that has not been the case. 
 
D.  The Stakeholder Alternative 
In contrast to shareholder primacy, the stakeholder model of the 
corporation, also called the communitarian or multifiduciary model,120 proposes 
that corporate governance should take all stakeholders in the corporate 
enterprise into account, rather than limiting governance power to 
shareholders.121 As an oppositional theory, stakeholder theory has largely served 
 
116 Id. at 771 (“[P]rincipal costs are more fundamental than agent costs, as the goal of 
reducing them is the reason that investors delegate control to managers . . . .”). 
117 Lund, supra note 6, at 497. 
118 Id.  
119 Lund, supra note 8, at 745. 
120 See Simone M. Sepe, Directors’ Duty to Creditors and the Debt Contract, 1 J. BUS. 
& TECH. L. 553 (2007) (noting that “communitarians . . . advocate a multifiduciary 
model where all corporate stakeholders benefit from the attribution of directors' 
fiduciary duties”). See also David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: 
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 11-12 
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (discussing the use of the multifiduciary model by 
communitarian corporate law scholars). 
121 See Millon, supra note 119, at 11-12 (discussing efforts to provide protections to 
nonshareholder constituencies); Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 293-94 (arguing that 
directors owe a duty to the corporation and that the corporation consists of all of the 
stakeholders who are responsible for the business of the enterprise). 
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to act as a rhetorical brake on some of the excesses of shareholder primacy.122 
But it often ends up reinforcing the status quo. If anything, stakeholder theory 
expands upon the discretion provided to the board and the management selected 
by the board to follow their own judgment in contravention to the will of the 
shareholders.  
The most important tangible contribution of stakeholder theory to corporate 
law has been the constituency statute, the law in a majority of states (but not 
Delaware).123 The constituency statute provides directors with the discretion to 
take the interests of all stakeholders into account when making certain types of 
decisions.124 Directors need not take other interests into account, and there is 
generally no remedy for other stakeholders. These statutes are just a way of 
insulating directors from claims that they failed to do enough for shareholders 
when contemplating a tender offer, merger, or factory shutdown. 
The real problem with stakeholder theory is that it is not, at least at present, 
a real theory of firm governance. Stakeholder theory lacks a model for allocating 
governance rights and responsibilities among the participants.125 The theory is 
more in tune with the nexus of contracts approach, as it treats all the participants 
in the firm as deserving of governance consideration. However, it fails to 
develop a system for managing the different stakeholders within the firm. 
Stakeholder theory does not, for example, argue that corporations are simply 
contractual nexuses and thus should not exist as legal entities.126 Nor, more 
 
122 For a discussion of those excesses, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side 
of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002); Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time 
Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006). 
123 Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 215 tbl.1 (2006) (finding 
that thirty-one states have constituency statutes). 
124 Some are limited to takeover/mergers, while others apply to all decisions. Millon, 
supra note 119, at 11-12. 
125 See Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 605, 611 (2009) (arguing that stakeholder theory fails to provide a system of 
mechanisms for governance, other than “balancing” stakeholder concerns); Joseph 
Heath, Business Ethics Without Stakeholders, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 533, 543 (2006) 
(arguing that stakeholder theory creates “extraordinary agency risks” because of the 
potential for conflicts). 
126 Instead, many stakeholder theorists also ascribe to the entity view of the corporation, 
which argues for treating the corporation as a state-created separate entity. Martin 
Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm-from Nature to Function, 118 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 1, 24 (2013) (“CSR scholars and stakeholder theorists have justified 
consideration of broader stakeholder interests by characterizing the firm as not merely 
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surprisingly, have stakeholder theorists sketched out a system whereby all 
stakeholders can participate in firm governance. Instead, stakeholder theorists 
have largely glommed on to the existing structure of corporate law, where 
shareholders elect directors who appoint officers.127  
 
III. THE FIRM AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
If we are to move beyond the current shareholder primacy model of 
corporate governance, we need a theory of governance to ground our new 
conception of the corporation. Economic theory is based, broadly, on the 
principle of efficiency. The “theory of the firm” is a subdiscipline of economics 
that focuses particularly on issues of organization and governance. The literature 
on the theory of the firm asks: why do we have firms, rather than markets?128 
This literature offers a sustained interdisciplinary inquiry into the nature of firms 
and their legal representations.129 While much of the current work in other social 
sciences, such a psychology and sociology, dovetails with economic theory and 
provides additional insights into the basic economic models,130 the theory of the 
firm offers a starting point for these inquiries and a basis upon which to build an 
alternative academic narrative. 
 
 
a legal fiction but rather as a moral organism with social and ethical responsibilities, or 
built upon the view of the corporation as an entity existing in time and as a distinct 
person.” (citations and quotations omitted)). 
127 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 2113 (discussing examples); cf. Emily 
Winston, Managerial Fixation and the Limitations of Shareholder Oversight, 
HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3219871 (arguing for a 
reduction of shareholder governance power through stakeholder reporting and 
stakeholder-focused managerial compensation). 
128 Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1757, 1757-65 (1989) (discussing various theories of the firm).  
129 Eric W. Orts, Business Persons: A Legal Theory of the Firm (2013); Scott E. Masten, 
A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 181 (1988). 
130 See Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning 
to the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1057 (2012) (noting that “the 
different social science disciplines—economics, psychology, sociology, 
anthropology—are increasingly borrowing from one another and bleeding into each 
other's work”). See also THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: 
RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Charles Heckscher & Paul 
S. Adler eds., 2006) [hereinafter COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY] (taking an 
organizational behavior approach). 
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A.  Applying the Theory of the Firm to Corporate Governance 
Research into the theory of the firm seeks to answer a fundamental question: 
Why do we even have firms at all? Markets allocate resources based on the best 
information available at the time.131 Firms, however, operate outside of this 
market structure, standing like “lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of 
buttermilk.”132 The law reflects this differentiation, as market transactions are 
generally governed by contract, while firms are created as specific legal entities 
with their own identity—partnerships, corporations, and LLCs, among others. 
Firms are meant to operate outside the market. But why? 
In early neoclassical economics, the theory of firm was quite rudimentary; 
the firm was simply a black box that took in inputs and produced outputs.133 No 
further dissection was undertaken. However, the black box did differentiate 
between what was inside the firm and what was outside: employees and capital 
assets were inside, while customers and suppliers were outside.134 Despite its 
crude form, this conception of the firm was useful in early economic modeling 
and retains that purpose even today. 
  An exploration of the internal workings and purpose of the firm begins with 
the work of Ronald Coase.135 In an oft-quoted passage from his concise 
masterpiece, The Nature of the Firm, Coase considered the firm-market 
distinction: 
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is 
coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the 
market. Within a firm these market transactions are eliminated, 
and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange 
transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who 
directs production. It is clear that these are alternative methods of 
coordinating production. Yet, having regard to the fact that, if 
production is regulated by price movements, production could be 
 
131 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520 
(1945). 
132 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (quoting 
D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1930)). 
133 Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2005) (“The 
predominant model of microeconomics, neoclassical price theory, assumes simply that 
the firm is a black box that maximizes profitability.”). 
134 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, 
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1631 (2001). 
135 Coase, supra note 131. 
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carried on without any organization at all, well we might ask, 
why is there any organization?136 
In answering this question, Coase turned to a theory of transaction costs. 
Contracting through markets and using the price mechanism can be costly. For 
certain transactions, Coase posited, it is cheaper to simply direct the production 
to occur rather than contracting for it each time. The hierarchy of the firm allows 
such transactions to be carried out by fiat, rather than through pricing, 
negotiating, and drafting a contract for each transaction.137 In other words, 
hierarchical governance within the firm was more efficient than market 
transactions. 
Coase’s theory of the firm relies heavily on the idea of the employment 
relationship. The structural differentiation between firm and market is the 
relationship between individual employees and the firm’s ownership or 
management. The employment relationship is not based on individual spot 
transactions, but rather an ongoing organizational relationship. As Coase 
famously noted: “If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he 
does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he was ordered 
to do so.”138 The relationship between the firm and the employee is the primary 
distinction between the firm and the market. It is the reason for the firm’s 
existence.  
This conclusion was cemented when Coase considered “whether the 
concept of a firm which has been developed fits in with that existing in the real 
world.”139 His answer? “We can best approach the question of what constitutes 
a firm in practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of 
‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”140 He then quoted at length 
from a treatise concerning the common law “control” test, which provides that 
“[t]he master must have the right to control the servant’s work, either personally 
or by another servant or agent.”141 He concluded: “We thus see that it is the fact 
of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer and 
 
136 Id. at 388. 
137 Id. at 390-92. 
138 Id. at 387. 
139 Id. at 403. 
140 Id.  
141 Id. at 404. 
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employee,’ just as it was in the economic concept which was developed 
above.”142 For Coase, the employer-employee relationship defined the firm.143 
Coase saw the nature of the firm as a hierarchical one in which managers 
controlled the efforts of employees. But the relationship between firm and 
employee need not be hierarchical. In an important response to Coase’s work, 
Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz also focused on the relationship of 
employees with other participants within the structure of the firm.144 However, 
they argued that Coase’s focus on control, authority, and direction was 
misleading.145 They put it this way, memorably: “Telling an employee to type 
this letter rather than to file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me 
this brand of tuna rather than that brand of bread.” Because employees are 
generally hired and fired at will, neither the employer nor the employee is bound 
to continue the relationship by any contractual obligations.146 
Alchian and Demsetz instead took a more holistic approach, focusing on 
the firm’s role in coordinating production in the midst of a variety of inputs. 
Team production is what separated firms from markets. Alchian and Demsetz 
defined team production as “production in which 1) several types of resources 
are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating 
resource.”147 As a result, team production is used when the coordinated effort 
increased productivity, after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring 
and disciplining the team.148 
The lack of “separable outputs” is the key problem that the firm is designed 
to manage. When capital providers and workers join together to carry on a 
business, it is difficult to assess the relative importance or value of the individual 
 
142 Id.  
143 See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 265, 296-97 (1998). 
144 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (“When a lumber mill employs 
a cabinetmaker, cooperation between specialists is achieved within a firm, and when a 
cabinetmaker purchases wood from a lumberman, the cooperation takes place across 
markets (or between firms).”). 
145 Id. (“To speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a 
deceptive way of noting that the employer continually is involved in renegotiation of 
contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties.”). 
146 Id. (“Long-term contracts between employer and employee are not the essence of 
the organization we call a firm.”). 
147 Id. at 779. 
148 Id. at 780. 
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contributions to that business in an easily measurable and ongoing formula. 
Firms allow these contributors to work together, sell their joint product, and then 
use the firm to manage both responsibilities and spoils. Alchian and Demsetz 
argued that a specialized, independent monitor was likely the best way of 
manage these issues.149 That central monitor—the recipient of the residual 
profits—would be the firm itself: a legal “person” who contracts for all other 
team inputs.150 The legal entity—such as the corporation—serves the role of 
coordinator. 
The Alchian and Demsetz joint-production model includes employees as 
well as investors within the definition of the firm. The purpose of the Alchian-
Demsetz firm is to manage labor and capital through the coordination of team 
production. Although they contribute capital, outside shareholders are relegated 
to the outer circles of power, as Alchian & Demsetz express skepticism about 
their ability to perform the monitoring function. They ask: 
In sum, is it the case that the stockholder-investor relationship is 
one emanating from the division of ownership among several 
people, or is it that the collection of investment funds from people 
of various anticipations is the underlying factor? If the latter, why 
should any of them be thought of as the owners in whom voting 
rights, whatever they may signify or however exercisable, should 
reside in order to enhance efficiency? Why voting rights in any 
of the outside, participating investors?151   
As the theory of the firm literature continued to develop, the critical 
question remained why some economic activities take place in markets and 
others take place within firms. The transaction-costs model identifies the types 
of contractual difficulties which are likely to lead to firm governance rather than 
market solutions.152 In situations where contributions and compensation can be 
harder to define, the parties will be left with incomplete contracts that require a 
 
149 Id. at 782-83. 
150 Alchian and Demsetz set forth the following characteristics of the firm: (a) joint 
input production, (b) several input owners, (c) one party is common to all the contracts 
of the joint inputs, (d) who has the rights to renegotiate any input’s contract 
independently of contracts with the other input owners, (e) who holds the residual claim, 
and (f) who has the right to sell his central contractual residual status. Id. at 783. 
151 Id. at 789 n.14. 
152 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, 
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. 
Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the 
Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1 (2008) (discussing transaction costs approach). 
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governance structure to prevent opportunism.153 This opportunism will be 
particularly problematic where one or both of the parties must invest significant 
resources in assets specific to the particular firm, project, or transaction.154 This 
asset specificity makes the parties susceptible to hold-ups from their contractual 
partners in the absence of a system of governance. Firms can be useful in 
providing the structures that deter opportunism.155 
The “property rights” theory of the firm, developed in a series of articles by 
Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John Moore, argues that firms are necessary 
as a repository of property rights for assets used in joint production.156 By 
owning the property outright, the firm prevents the problem of the commons (in 
which no one holds property rights over valuable assets) as well as the problem 
of the anticommons (in which property rights are divvied up among too many 
disparate actors). The Grossman-Hart-Moore model dictates that those who 
contribute the most valuable and most asset-specific property to the joint 
enterprise should control the firm.157 They are not only most necessary to the 
firm’s success; they are also the most vulnerable to hold-up problems as the joint 
enterprise moves forward in time. 
 
153 Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, 1 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. 369, 373 (2005) (“Governance problems are posed when incomplete contracts (to 
include unforeseen contingencies) are combined with opportunism.”). 
154 George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99, 
153 (2009) (“Oliver Williamson has significantly expanded upon Coase's initial insight 
by discussing the importance of bundling relationship-specific assets into a firm to 
avoid counterparty opportunism, and, more generally, by showing how a proper 
conception of transaction costs should include both the direct costs of managing 
relationships and the opportunity costs of suboptimal governance decisions.”). 
155 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47-48 (1996); 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 152, at 114-15. 
156 See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); 
Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John 
Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); 
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 1119 (1990). 
157 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1399, 1404-05 (2002) (“The central insight of the property rights theory of the 
firm is that an appropriate allocation of ownership rights over the assets of a firm 
reduces the likelihood that one party will unfairly take advantage of the other 
participants within the firm.”) 
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The “access” model defines a firm “both in terms of unique assets (which 
may be physical or human) and in terms of the people who have access to these 
assets.”158 Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales define access as “the ability to 
use, or work with, a critical resource.”159 As Rajan and Zingales make clear, 
“[t]he agent who is given privileged access to the resource gets no new residual 
rights of control. All she gets is the opportunity to specialize her human capital 
to the resource and make herself valuable.”160 Combined with her right to leave 
the firm, access gives the employee the ability to “create a critical resource that 
she controls: her specialized human capital.”161 Control over this critical 
resource is a source of power. Gordon Smith has further developed this “critical 
resource” theory of the firm in outlining a theory of fiduciary duties that are 
responsible to vulnerabilities created by critical resources.162 
Employees’ contributions to the firm—often described as “human 
capital”—can be characterized as assets of both the firm and the employee. 
Some types of human capital are portable, such as education or general skills, 
but other types are specific to the firm and cannot be taken by the employee 
elsewhere. To the extent an employee has invested in firm-specific human 
capital, she is subject to opportunistic behavior, since she cannot plausibly 
threaten to use that capital at a rival firm. One aspect of this capital—
knowledge—has served as the basis for a new set of approaches to the firm.163 
Knowledge-based theories focus on the need to produce, distribute, and 
ultimately retain valuable knowledge-based assets within the firm.164 Choices 
 
158 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. 
ECON. 387, 390 (1998). 
159 Id. at 388. 
160 Id.  
161 Id.  
162 Smith, supra note 156, at 1404 (“[T]the critical resource theory reveals that the 
beneficiary’s vulnerability emanates from an inability to protect against opportunism 
by the fiduciary with respect to the critical resource.”). 
163 See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions, and 
Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
1123 (2007); Sarah Kaplan et al., Knowledge-Based Theories of the Firm: A Review 
and Extension, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 242 (2002). See also Katherine V.W. Stone, 
Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing 
Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002) (discussing legal conceptions that govern the 
ownership of human capital within the workplace). 
164 Gorga & Michael Halberstam, supra note 162, at 1137 (criticizing the property rights 
theory for failing to account for the importance of employees as assets). 
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between centralized and multi-divisional organizational structures,165 or 
between covenants not to compete and employee stock options,166 are made to 
manage the control of knowledge within the firm. Along the same lines, a 
capability-based theory of the firm focuses on employees’ firm-specific 
knowledge and learning that can be translated into joint production.167 Another 
perspective on the firm, this time from organizational theory, sees the firm as a 
“collaborative community” in which employees work together toward common 
goals.168  
Looking over the trajectory of the theory of the firm, we see that the primary 
concern has been over the shape and internal organization for these entities that 
operate outside of the standard market relationships. And the theories of the firm 
all seem to acknowledge the important role of workers within the firm. Going 
back to Coase, the firm was designed to manage the relationship between those 
who started or managed the business and those who worked for the business. 
The work of the business was best managed internally, rather than through 
external markets. And the firm itself was made up of those who worked for the 
firm, along with those who “managed” the firm—also workers—and those who 
“owned” the firm through financial assets. 
 
B. The Legal Construction of Firm Governance 
Because the firm is the primary organizational engine of economic activity 
and growth, the internal governance of the firm takes on supreme importance. 
The corporate form, and its systematic exclusion of employees from governance, 
is not endemic to economic organization. Partnerships, for example, were the 
original legal structure for organizing a group of people into a firm. Unlike 
corporations, partnerships have never required an explicit grant of authority 
from the government to operate.169 In fact, courts can determine that a group of 
 
165 Id. at 1173-83. 
166 Id. at 1183-92. Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and Boundaries of 
Technology Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1686-88 (2009) (discussing the 
role of covenants not to compete in managing innovation within the firm). 
167 Thomas McInerney, Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 135, 139. 
168 See Paul S. Adler & Charles Heckscher, Towards Collaborative Community, in 
COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY, supra note 129, at 11, 13. 
169 See D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 53 
(2004) (“[N]o formalities are required to form a partnership.”); Christine Hurt, 
Partnership Lost, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 497 (2019) (“Partnerships existed at 
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people had been operating as a partnership, even if they had never declared 
themselves to be partners or considered themselves to be within a partnership.170 
Instead, the test is whether the parties had formed “an association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”171 There are numerous 
examples of situations where people working together on the assumption that 
the worker was an employee turned out to be partners under the law.172 
Under the default rules of a partnership, all participants have equal voting 
rights and equal rights to vote on partnership matters.173 The control rights in a 
partnership extend even to ordinary, everyday matters of the business.174 Of 
course, “one partner, one vote” is only the default rule. Partners who 
contemplate varying levels of input and interest will generally construct a 
partnership agreement that allocates votes as well as shares of the residual profits 
according to mutual agreement.175 Partners are free to divvy up voting power 
according to contributions, seniority, experience, involvement, and other factors 
relevant to governance. The default rules are a bit more structured for the limited 
partnership, the limited liability partnership, and the limited liability company. 
These organizations envision participants with stakes in the residual who do not 
participate in management. For example, limited partnerships must make clear 
who the managerial partners are, and who the limited partners are.176 Limited 
liability companies have what is known as “chameleon” management: “the firm 
 
common law in England and in the United States before partnership acts were 
promulgated in the 1800s.”). 
170 See, e.g., Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tenn. 1991) (holding that “it is not 
essential that the parties actually intend to become partners.”). 
171 Unif. P’ship Act § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 202(a) 
(amended 1997). 
172 See, e.g., Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tex. 2009); Holmes v. Lerner, 74 
Cal. App. 4th 442 (1999); Smith v. Redd, 593 So. 2d 989, 991 (Miss. 1991);  
173 Unif. P’ship Act § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 401(f) 
(amended 1997). 
174 See Unif. P’ship Act § 18(h), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 401(j) 
(amended 1997). 
175 See, e.g., Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986, 992 (D.D.C. 1975) (discussing 
how “statutory rules governing the rights and duties of the partners are ‘subject to any 
agreement between them.”’). 
176 See Rev. Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 303 (amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 144-45 (1995). 
However, under the original Uniform Limited Partnership Act, limited partners may be 
subject to liability as managing partners if they participate in the governance. Unif. Ltd. 
P’ship Act § 7 (1916), 6A U.L.A. 336 (1995) (“A limited partner shall not become liable 
as a general partner unless ... he takes part in the control of the business.”). 
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can choose either direct partnership-type control by the members or centralized 
control by managers that is closer to, but not as rigid as, the limited partnership 
format.”177 Participants in these enterprises have substantial flexibility in 
arranging the division of ownership and control rights. 
The corporation, in contrast, represents a shareholder-oriented governance 
structure—one that leaves out other participants. In smaller corporations known 
as closely-held corporations, the same basic corporate structure is used, but these 
businesses must adapt the corporate form’s rigidity for their purposes.178 Many 
closely-held companies have different classes of shares as a method of allocating 
control among different groups of shareholders.179 In addition, shareholders may 
agree to certain voting arrangements, such as the pooling of votes into a voting 
trust or an agreement to vote together.180 These voting arrangements consolidate 
a group of disparate shareholders into a majority and provide protection to 
minority shareholders over certain critical matters.181 Corporate law can also 
protect minority shareholders against undue oppression through specifically-
tailored equitable relief. Such oppression often relates to the ability of minority 
shareholders to partake in other aspects of the corporate pie—specifically, 
employment.182 Even if shareholders are all sharing equally in the profits, the 
minority oppression doctrine may still order the majority shareholders to 
 
177 Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership, 26 J. CORP. L. 819, 843 (2001). 
178 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 
(Mass. 1975) (defining closely held corporations as having “(1) a small number of 
stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority 
stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of the 
corporation.”). 
179 Preferred stock is particularly common in start-up corporations. Venture capital 
investors prefer to invest with preferred stock, which converts into common stock with 
multiple voting shares if certain triggers are reached. William W. Bratton, Venture 
Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
891, 892 (2002) (noting that “[c]onvertible preferred stock is the dominant financial 
contract in the venture capital market.”). 
180 See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 486-96 (2000). 
181 Perhaps the most famous example of such a trust involves the Ringling family of 
circus fame. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947) 
(upholding such a trust). 
182 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976) 
(finding “no legitimate business purpose” to the majority’s decision to suspend a 
minority shareholder’s salary, fail to reelect him as a director, and fail to appoint him 
as an officer); Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative, Inc., 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 379 
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (minority shareholder terminated from his position as treasurer 
by majority shareholders). 
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approve a dividend or to provide employment opportunities within the company 
for minority shareholders.183 
This divergence between the cookie-cutter structure of corporation 
governance and the more tailored approaches of other systems suggests that 
corporations could reconsider their lockstep approach. And in fact, recent 
developments in shareholding structures illustrate a breakdown in the one-share, 
one-vote consensus model. Companies such as Facebook, Google, and Snap 
have stock structures that grant the company founders special control rights 
beyond their common stock holdings.184 Preferred stock is also used to provide 
control rights in certain circumstances, such as the failure to make a payment or 
the approach of the company’s dissolution.185 Companies are getting creative in 
order to accommodate the special circumstances of their particular business 
firm.186 
More broadly, corporate law needs to dig deeper into the theory of the firm. 
It needs to reexamine the premise that corporate governance is only about 
shareholders, directors, and officers. In particular, corporate law policymakers 
and theorists need to look at all of the corporation’s stakeholders and determine 
if governance rights are appropriate as a way of managing their preferences. 
Prior to recent proposed legislation,187 the U.S. corporate law community has 
not seriously entertained any significant changes to the corporate franchise. 
Even team-production proponents have only prodded the board to directors to 
 
183 For a further discussion of the protection of minority shareholders vis-à-vis the 
protection of political minorities, see Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and 
Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119 (2003). 
184 Lund, supra note 8, at 694. 
185 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW & ECONOMICS 66-67 (2002) 
(“[P]referred stock may have a preference over common stock with respect to dividends 
and/or liquidation”). Preferred shares have often been ignored in the debate about 
shareholder wealth maximization, with the assumption that the shareholders in question 
are the common stock holders. See id. at 66 (noting that preferred stock is “an odd beast, 
neither wholly fish nor wholly fowl”); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A 
Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1820 (2013) (“Preferred stock sits 
on a fault line between two great private law paradigms, corporate law and contract law. 
It is neither one nor the other; rather, it draws on both.”). 
186 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 773 (“[B]ecause the impact of a given 
governance structure on control costs is firm-specific, there is no particular governance 
structure that can be described as intrinsically good, bad, welfare enhancing, or 
inefficient.”). 
187 See, e.g., Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work 
Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. (2018). 
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consider the interests of stakeholders.188 With the power structures already in 
place, it makes little sense to imagine a stakeholder-rights theory without any 
positive governance power for stakeholders. As former Delaware Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Leo Strine has emphasized: 
Under the DGCL [Delaware General Corporate Law] only 
stockholders have the right to vote for directors; approve 
certificate amendments; amend the bylaws; approve certain other 
transactions, such as mergers, and certain asset sales and leases; 
and enforce the DGCL’s terms and hold directors accountable for 
honoring their fiduciary duties. In the corporate republic, no 
constituency other than stockholders is given any power.189 
Voting rights are the only way to provide a real voice to preferences within the 
corporation’s governance structure.190  
 
C.  A Shared Governance Model of the Firm 
1.  Participation in Joint Production 
Corporations exist to facilitate economic production.191 The corporate form 
is not the same thing as a business; an actual business consists of ideas, 
relationships, economic activity, and legal rights. The corporate form is part of 
this mix.192 The corporation is a legal fiction that creates rights and duties; the 
 
188 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56. 
189 Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 763-66 (2015); see also Hon. 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That for-Profit Corporations 
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 135-36 (2012) (“[T]he continued failure of 
our societies to be clear-eyed about the role of the for-profit corporation endangers the 
public interest.”). 
190 Smith, supra note 156, at 1458 (contemplating that “the key residual ownership right 
in the corporation is the right to elect directors”). 
191 RIBSTEIN, supra note 58, at 4 (“The corporation undeniably has driven business 
growth in the United States since the Industrial Revolution.”). 
192 William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under 
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521 (1982) (suggesting that “the most useful way to 
analyze the modern business enterprise is to interpret the terms of the economic 
arrangements of a firm (partnership, corporation, cooperative) and the terms of the 
related economic arrangements that should not be analyzed separately from the firm 
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business firm is the ongoing social phenomenon that is the business. The legal 
part of the business equation is meant to facilitate the social and economic 
phenomenon.  
The economic distribution of the responsibilities for production, as well as 
the distribution of the fruits of production, will ultimately rest in the hands of 
those with organizational power. Much of the debate in corporate law over the 
last forty years—perhaps even the last century—has concerned the distribution 
of corporate power between the board, the officers, and the shareholders.193 
Shareholder advocates have pushed for corporate law reforms that provide more 
direct power to stockholders.194 Management and stakeholder advocates have 
argued that boards need more insulation from shareholders and less scrutiny, 
even if their ultimate aims remain shareholder wealth maximization.195 In this 
second group, there is a subset of advocates who argue that stakeholders such as 
employees, creditors, consumers, and communities deserve some protection 
within the process.196 But stakeholder supporters generally provide directors 
with the freedom to merely consider all stakeholder interests, rather than 
granting voting power to these stakeholders.197  
If the firm is designed to help manage a system of joint production, then the 
governance of the firm should include those who participate in the joint 
production. The distinction between markets and firms is this distinction 
between the use of straightforward contracts to manage relationships and the 
need for governance mechanisms to manage relationships. 198 Firms involve the 
complexities of ongoing joint production between participants who cannot 
reduce their interactions simply to contractual performance metrics. Instead, the 
 
(distributorship, loan agreement, employment contracts) as a series of bargains subject 
to constraints and made in contemplation of a long-term relationship”). 
193 For the beginnings of the debate over the separation of ownership and control, see 
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). See also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 57 (discussing the problem 
of agency costs in light of the separation of ownership and control). 
194 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 3. 
195 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 550; Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The 
Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 754 (2007); Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 804-05 (2007). 
196 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 313. 
197 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 56, at 2113 (discussing the “strange turn” against 
stakeholder board representation). 
198 See Bengt Holmstrom, The Firm as a Subeconomy, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 80 
(1999) (“When contracts are incomplete in the sense that they cannot incorporate all 
future contracting opportunities, governance becomes consequential.”). 
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participants create another entity—the firm—to serve as the locus of their 
production and to structure both the inputs required by the participants and to 
divvy up the outputs among them. 
Shareholders and employees are invested in the firm in such a way that they 
need firm governance to protect against opportunism. When it comes to their 
contractual vulnerability, shareholders are indeed situated differently from other 
capital providers (such as creditors).199 Shareholders invest their money into the 
firm with no ability to withdraw it and subject to uncertain payoffs, largely at 
the discretion of management.200 Employees are also firm investors. They have 
invested their labor, reputations, and firm-specific individual capital in the firm 
and cannot not pull these investments out.201 Under the law, they are 
compensated on a more regular basis, and with less discretion, than 
shareholders.202 However, they still operate within the firm, as opposed to 
suppliers and outside contractors who provide their services through markets.203 
 
199 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 68-69; Benjamin Means, A 
Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 
1197 (2010) (discussing the problem of “shareholder oppression” and vulnerability, and 
the inability of contracts to unequivocally protect such shareholders). 
200 See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for 
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 392 (2003) 
(citing the importance of “resource commitment” or capital lock-in as a critical reason 
for the success of the corporation as a private enterprise). 
201 See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 
302 (1998) (noting that firm-specific skills “make a worker more valuable to her present 
employer, but also make her more vulnerable to a firm’s opportunistic behavior”); 
Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9 
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 368 (2010). 
202 As late as the nineteenth century, employees worked for terms as long as a year and 
were not entitled to any contractual payment if they left before the end. See, e.g., Stark 
v. Parker, 19 Mass. 267, 292-94 (1824) (denying any contractual recovery for an 
employee who left after nine months of a twelve-month job); Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 
481, 491-92 (1834) (denying contractual recovery but allowing for recovery under 
restitution). Now, however, wage and hour laws require payment for time worked and 
periodic payments made to the employee. See generally Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 
(2012)). 
203 Scholars have made a case for consumer governance rights in a limited set of 
circumstances. See HANSMANN, supra note 82, at 149-223 (discussing specific 
instances of customer-owned enterprises); David G. Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in 
Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 253 (2009) [hereinafter Yosifon, Consumer 
Interest] (arguing that consumers are inadequately represented in corporate 
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The theory of the firm supports a governance model that includes 
employees. Theory of the firm scholars have long appreciated the importance of 
the employee to our conception of the firm.204 Ronald Coase looked to the 
relationship between employer and employee to demonstrate empirical support 
for his theory of the firm.205 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz argued that the 
importance of the firm (as separate from the market) stems from the need to 
coordinate production from a variety of inputs.206 Team production is used—
and firms replace markets—when the coordinated effort increases productivity, 
after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring and disciplining the 
 
governance); David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-in and the Theory of the Firm, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (2012) [hereinafter Yosifon, Lock-in] (concluding that 
“a departure from the shareholder wealth maximization norm and an embrace of a 
multi-stakeholder corporate governance regime may be necessary to overcome agency 
problems associated with consumer lock-in”). 
204 See generally Coase, supra note 131, at 401-05. 
205 See id. at 403 (“We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in 
practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of ‘master and 
servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”). 
206 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 143, at 778 (describing the firm as a “centralized 
contractual agent in a team production process”). 
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team.207 Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout relied on this notion of team production 
in developing their stakeholder-based theory.208  
By adding employees to the governance mix, we are not opening it up to all 
stakeholders. The non-separable inputs within team production really belong to 
employees and shareholders.209 Shareholders provide capital that is taken within 
the firm and turned into discretionary funds.210 Employees work together under 
the aegis of the firm to produce goods or services in a manner that generally 
cannot be separated out to assign specific values.211 Other participants are not 
integrated into the team production process, and, thus, do not need to work 
within the firm.212 Creditors provide money on fixed terms.213 Suppliers and 
independent contractors provide specific services outside of the firm’s scope. 
Consumers purchase the goods or services after the production process is 
complete.214 And the surrounding community regulates the firm as it does all 
other individuals and organizations within its jurisdiction. If we say that all of 
these participants are engaged in the production process, it proves too much—
then all participants in the market would be engaged in commerce with one 
another. Employees and shareholders are part of that team production process in 
a way that stakeholders outside the firm are not.215 
 
207 Id. at 780. 
208 See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 275 (analyzing the “team production problem” 
arising “when a number of individuals must invest firm-specific resources to produce a 
nonseparable output”). 
209 See id. at 249 (“If the team members’ investments are firm-specific . . . and if output 
from the enterprise is nonseparable, . . . serious problems can arise in determining how 
any economic surpluses generated by team production . . . should be divided.”). 
210 See id. at 277 (“Providers of financial capital—shareholders and even, potentially, 
some creditors—are, by this agreement, just as ‘stuck’ in the firm as are providers of 
specialized human capital.”). 
211 Id. at 261. 
212 See id. at 269 (arguing that “employees, shareholders, and executives” are the main 
players on the corporate “team”). 
213 But cf. Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical 
Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1652-55 (2002) (arguing that “[t]here is 
no doubt that creditors who loan money to publicly held corporations thereby make a 
team-specific investment” but that they are “less vulnerable to opportunism when 
trading with publicly held corporations” when compared to other team members). 
214 See Yosifon, Consumer Interest, supra note 202, at 259 (discussing the cabined role 
of some consumers in the transacting process). 
215 Some stakeholder theorists have advocated specifically for employee governance 
rights. GREENFIELD, supra note 29, at 112 (advocating for a special role for employees 
in corporate law, including the possibility of board representation); Brett H. McDonnell, 
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Concern for the fates of other stakeholders is understandable and may, in 
some circumstances, warrant a species of governance protection. Creditors, for 
example, may receive specific protections when the company is close to 
bankruptcy as a way of mitigating their particular vulnerabilities in such 
situations.216 Certain consumers may have the type of long-term, invested 
interests, such that some governance and/or ownership rights may make 
sense.217 In the main, however, government regulation will be the most 
straightforward way of managing issues that arise and are not amenable to 
contractual resolution. Creditors have statutory rights within bankruptcy.218 
Consumer protection laws can place mandatory terms or disclosure requirements 
 
Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
429, 430–31 (2011) (evaluating “a number of possible strategies for creating a role for 
employees in corporate governance”); see also Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, 
or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 334 
(2008) (promoting employee primacy); Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the 
Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing A Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced 
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991); Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the 
American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97 (2000). 
Others have noted that employees have a stronger or the strongest case among 
stakeholders for participation in governance. Millon, supra note 119, at 14 (noting that 
“[t]he most compelling theoretical arguments for nonshareholder protection have 
focused on employees,” and that “the relative inadequacy of bargaining power and other 
disadvantages may more seriously impede bargained-for protection for employees than 
for other nonshareholder groups”). 
216 See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an 
End, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 296 (2015) (“[C]ourts should revert to their traditional 
focus on policing against the bargaining failures that can occur when investors use 
directors to address the incomplete contracting challenges that are replete in corporate 
finance.”); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of 
Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 119 (2009) 
[hereinafter Tung, Leverage] (arguing that “bank creditors and other private lenders 
often enjoy significant oversight and influence over managerial decisions”). For a 
discussion of the possible expansion of fiduciary duties to creditors, see Frederick Tung, 
The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57 
EMORY L.J. 809, 814-15 (2008) [hereinafter Tung, Fiduciary Duties]. 
217 See HANSMANN, supra note 82, at 149-68 (discussing consumer ownership); 
Yosifon, Lock-In, supra note 202, at 1449-59 (discussing types of lock-in situations). 
218 See Tung, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 215, at 842 (“By the time the firm is in 
distress, its creditors will enjoy differing rights (including payment and priority rights), 
differing stakes in the continuation of the borrower firm, and differing contract 
protections.”). 
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on firms.219 Environmental protections address externalities by imposing costs 
on firms (and individuals) for creating those externalities.220 But corporate 
governance, like all firm governance, should be addressed to solving problems 
that arise within the firm structure—problems related to team production.221 
Employees and shareholders are the stakeholders engaged in the process of team 
production within the firm.222  
 
  2.  Information within the Firm 
   A system of shared governance better reflects the flow of information within 
the firm. Information has always been the strange paradox at the heart of 
corporate law theory. Shareholders delegate governance power to management 
because they do not have the time or resources to get the information necessary 
to make independent governance decisions. And yet shareholder primacy asks 
shareholders to vote with sufficient knowledge and understanding to curb 
agency costs and direct the corporation efficiently. This paradox has come into 
 
219 Cf. Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the 
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1147, 1169 (2010) (“Despite the many state and federal statutes that have been 
enacted in the last forty years to regulate consumer transactions, the underlying contract 
between the company and the consumer remains crucial in determining the rights and 
liabilities of the parties.”). 
220 Individual shareholders at individual companies can no doubt use corporate law and 
governance to advance environmental concerns. See Sarah E. Light, The Law of the 
Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 140 (2019) (arguing that 
“the law governing the corporation throughout its life cycle—corporate law, securities 
regulation, antitrust law, and bankruptcy law—should be understood as a fundamental 
part of environmental law”).  For a discussion of the use of voting power to provide 
stakeholders with influence in benefit corporations, see Brett H. McDonnell, From Duty 
and Disclosure to Power and Participation in Social Enterprise, 70 ALA. L. REV. 77, 
124 (2018). 
221 See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 250 (“[P]ublic corporation law can offer a 
second-best solution to team production problems because it allows rational individuals 
who hope to profit from team production to overcome shirking and rent-seeking by 
opting into an internal governance structure we call the ‘mediating hierarchy.’”). 
222 Note that a shared governance structure for the firm would align with William 
Bratton’s description of the corporate purpose: “corporate law should facilitate 
corporate attempts to maximize productive output (and hence wealth) in a competitive 
economy, encouraging long-term investment at the lowest cost of capital, subject to 
exterior regulations that control externalities.” William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose 
for Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713, 723-24 (2014). 
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fuller view of late, as theorists raise powerful concerns about the “competence 
costs” of principal governance223 and the voting rights of passive funds.224 
  Employees have information about the firm that they obtain through their 
everyday experience with the company without additional cost. Yet they have 
no formal governance mechanisms for using this information to help guide the 
company. The overwhelming majority of private sector employees are not 
represented by a union.225 Even if employees are represented by a union, that 
union has no formal right to bargain with the company over issues of managerial 
prerogative, such as new product lines, marketing, acquisitions, or the 
composition of the board.226 The formal mechanism for employee input is the 
proverbial suggestion box. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, both academic and popular business literature 
explored ways in which firms could better process and utilize information held 
by employees.227 The success of Japanese businesses led many to investigate 
ways in which Japanese firms better integrated employee decisionmaking.228 
Internal systems involving “quality circles” and “quality improvement teams” 
were heralded as a way of drawing employee know-how into daily operations.229 
 
223 Goshen & Squire, supra note 7, at 785-90. 
224 Lund, supra note 6, at 497. 
225 Union Member Summary, BUREAU L. STAT. (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (finding that 6.4% of private-sector 
employees are unionized). 
226 Employers only need to bargain about terms and conditions of employment; they 
need not discuss areas within the “core of entrepreneurial control.” NLRB v. Wooster 
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (discussing the mandatory 
subjects of collective bargaining); SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW T. BODIE, 
LABOR LAW 134-39 (2016). 
227 For a sampling of the legal academic literature—much of it involving employee 
ownership—see MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (1995); THE NEW 
RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION (Margaret M. Blair 
& Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000); JOSEPH R. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: 
REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? (1988); HANSMANN, supra note 82, at 66-119; PAUL WEILER, 
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990); Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 
67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159, 160 (1991). 
228 See, e.g., ROBERT E. COLE, WORK, MOBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE INDUSTRY (1980); Jon Gertner, 
From 0 to 60 to World Domination, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007 (Magazine), at 34. 
229 See, e.g., JOSEPH M. JURAN, QUALITY BY DESIGN (1992); DAVID I. LEVINE, 
REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE: HOW BUSINESS AND EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN 
(1995); PAUL LILLRANK & NORIAKI KANO, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT: QUALITY 
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Such methods stood in opposition to hierarchical management structures and the 
Taylorist method of production, which held that managers generated the 
information and disseminated it down the ladder.230 Although many of these 
structures are in use today,231 they almost always do not extend power to the 
higher reaches of the corporation, where true power sits. 
This gap between knowledge on the employees’ part and power on the 
shareholders’ part seems inefficient. Shareholders and employees could work 
together to pool their information and their power to police decisions of 
management. To take just one example: the process of carrying out a corporate 
combination, such as a merger or sale of substantially all assets, generally 
follows a prescribed pattern. After some set of the top corporate officers agree 
to the deal, the companies must secretly and expeditiously conduct due diligence 
using high-level management and outside consultants. If this hastily-conducted 
due diligence uncovers no problems, the boards approve the combination and 
announce the deal to the public and shareholders. The shareholders generally 
have a couple months to digest the proxy materials and media reports before 
they vote to approve or quash the merger. If the combination receives 
shareholder and regulatory approval, the combination ultimately goes into 
effect.232 There are strategic reasons for the structure of this process: secrecy 
prevents poaching and keeps failed negotiations under the rug.233 While this 
secrecy serves a purpose, it also narrowly restricts both the information and the 
perspectives that can be brought to bear. As a result, corporate combinations are 
extremely top-down affairs. From start to finish, the typical corporate 
combination is hampered by the absence of critical information. Employees are 
a natural fit to help overcome this information deficit—they have specialized 
 
CONTROL CIRCLES IN JAPANESE INDUSTRY (1989); Erin White, How a Company Made 
Everyone a Team Player, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2007, at B1. 
230 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing 
Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 143-46 (1988) 
(discussing Taylorism in the workplace). 
231 New managerial methodologies providing for participatory management and 
employee voice are increasingly popular around the globe. See, e.g., LALOUX, supra 
note 15; ROBERTSON, supra note 15. 
232 For a discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the AOL-Time Warner merger, 
see Bodie, supra note 121. 
233 See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1988) (discussing the 
importance of keeping merger negotiations secret). 
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information from the shop floor that is often undervalued by expensive corporate 
consultants.234  
Employees also have information about the agency costs associated with 
managerial opportunism—information that shareholders are not likely to have. 
While directors may be expected to police such opportunism, there are a variety 
of reasons to doubt their effectiveness. First, the directors themselves may be in 
on the deal; the firm may decide to award bonuses to directors as well as 
managers.235 Second, directors may already feel beholden to managers. Top-
level executives have significant power over the board nomination and 
reelection process236 as well as the directorial compensation process.237 Personal 
ties help cement the feelings of loyalty and friendship.238 Third, directors are 
part-timers; they themselves do not have the same quantity and depth of 
information that employees have. Boards may end up trusting that investment 
bankers, compensation consultants, and other advisors have dealt with the 
compensation issue sufficiently, when in fact these advisors have their own set 
of conflicts.239 
 
234 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL 
DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 231-36 (1984) (discussing the practice of 
“flexible specialization” on the shop floor). See also MIKE ROSE, THE MIND AT WORK: 
VALUING THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE AMERICAN WORKER xxxiv (2004) (discussing the 
various intelligences of different types of workers). 
235 See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 331-33 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing the issues 
surrounding a stock option grant to directors). 
236 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 25-27 (2004). 
237 Id. at 27-31 (discussing how top-level managers can financially reward directors). 
238 Brian G.M. Main, Charles A. O’Reilly III & James Wade, The CEO, the Board of 
Directors, and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4 
INDUS. & CORP CHANGE 292 (1995). 
239 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 235, at 37-39. See also In re Walt Disney 
Shareholders’ Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 704-11 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 
2006) (discussing the process through which Michael Ovitz was hired by Walt Disney 
in 1995). Despite denying the duties of care and good faith challenge against the Ovitz 
hiring, Chancellor Chandler acknowledged that “the compensation committee met for 
one hour” to discuss the terms of Michael Ovitz’s compensation along with the 
compensation packages for various Disney employees, 121 stock option grants, top-
level executive Robert Iger’s employment agreement, and board member and 
compensation committee chair Irwin Russell's $250,000 compensation for negotiating 
the Ovitz deal. Id. at 708 (emphasis in the original). 
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Although their interests may diverge in other contexts, employees are 
ideally situated to join with shareholders in an effort to police management. 
Indeed, this already appears to be taking place. Labor unions, for example, have 
become much more involved in traditional corporate governance activism.240 In 
the 1980s, unions were generally antagonistic to shareholder concerns and 
supported anti-takeover tactics such as constituency statutes.241 However, 
unions and union-associated pension funds have joined the side of shareholders 
in pushing through shareholder-friendly corporate governance measures.242 
Pension fund managers have been at the forefront in governance efforts to 
strengthen shareholder voting rights,243 rein in the power of the CEO,244 and 
fight fraud and abuse by insiders.245 These measures suggest an ongoing role for 
union activism: an alliance with shareholders in an effort to maximize long-term 
growth for shareholders and other stakeholders. Employee board representation 
would provide a conduit for this kind of agency-costs information for the 93 
percent of private-sector employees who are not represented by a union.246 
Whether unionized or not, employees have an interest in working with 
shareholders to prevent executives from taking advantage of the other 
stakeholders in the company. 
Unlike employees, consumers, suppliers, creditors, and other stakeholders 
all sit outside the firm and are less likely to have the breadth and depth of 
understanding that employees have. These stakeholders will have some slice of 
information about the firm by dint of their market relationships, and in certain 
circumstances those relationships may justify limited governance input or even 
governance rights.247 However, as a matter of course, employees are much more 
 
240 See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: 
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998). 
241 Id. at 1036. 
242 Id. at 1045. (“The amazing thing about these union-sponsored shareholder proposals 
is how ordinary they are, from the perspective of any institutional investor.”). See 
generally DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: 
LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON (2018).  
243 WEBBER, supra note 241, at 45-78. 
244 Id. at 111-51. 
245 Id. at 164-80. 
246 Union Member Summary, BUREAU L. STAT. (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (finding that 6.4% of private-sector 
employees are unionized). 
247 For a discussion of various ownership structures for different types of firms, see 
HANSMANN, supra note 82. 
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likely to hold information that would usefully contribute to the governance 
process and be in a position to share it.  
The theory of the firm separates those who engage in the ongoing business 
of the firm from those who contract with the firm from the outside. Those inside 
the corporation should have their preferences captured through more direct 
governance mechanisms such as voting, those outside through processes like 
contract or regulation. Under this understanding of the firm, employees are the 
classic insiders, a conclusion that’s only reinforced by more recent work on the 
generation and flow of information within firms. The economic theory of the 
firm, then, provides a powerful argument for extending the corporate franchise 
to employees. 
 
IV. DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION AND SHARED GOVERNANCE 
 When it comes to the corporate franchise, the theory of the firm provides a 
solid economic foundation for separating the interests of shareholders and 
employees from those of other corporate constituents. It is not, however, the 
only theoretical justification for that separation. In this part, we explore the 
lessons that democratic theory has to offer to corporate governance. In 
particular, we look at governance from the broad perspective of preference 
aggregation and develop a theory of democratic participation that allows us to 
determine whose preferences are best captured through voting rather than 
contract. We then apply that framework to corporate governance and find that 
it, too, counsels in favor of shared governance between shareholders and 
employees.  
 
A.  Corporations and Democracy 
All of the institutions that comprise modern market-based societies—from 
large governments to small businesses—employ decisionmaking structures 
designed to take account of the preferences of their constituents. They 
sometimes rely upon compacts or contracts, which are thought to ensure the 
preference satisfaction of everyone involved.248 Once institutions reach a certain 
size and complexity, though, contracts alone cannot do the job: they must resort 
to some type of voting mechanism to aggregate preferences. This is true of 
almost all institutions, both political and corporate, that claim to serve some sort 
of constituency. It is certainly true of the modern corporation. 
 
248 See, e.g., Stephen E. Ellis & Grant M. Hayden, The Cult of Efficiency in Corporate 
Law, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 239, 248-49 (2010). 
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Since corporate governance involves, at least in part, the use of voting 
mechanisms to aggregate preferences, it seems reasonable to turn to political 
theory in analyzing its structures and relationships. Public choice theory, with 
its emphasis on the interests of different groups and its analysis of the effect of 
different structures on outcomes, would seem to present a natural methodology 
for studying corporate governance.249 More generally, political theory concerns 
the allocation and transfer of power in decisionmaking and the roles of different 
institutions in the governance of a polity. That said, economics, so far, has 
dominated corporate law to the almost complete exclusion of political theory, 
perhaps because corporate law theorists are sometimes suspicious of political 
analogies (despite borrowing what they think is useful).250 And while we 
obviously think economics has its place in the discussion, politics may also be 
instructive at the fundamental level of the structure of the corporation. 
This is not to say that political and corporate institutions, or political and 
corporate voting, are the same thing. For example, those who currently vote in 
corporate elections—shareholders—may enter and exit the corporation more 
freely than citizens can move between polities; and shareholder voting, as 
currently structured, is a relatively meaningless exercise in terms of exerting 
influence over most corporate decisions.251 These points are well taken. But at 
some level of generality, both types of institutions purport to have governance 
structures designed to aggregate preferences. The purpose of a system of 
governance is to manage different interests despite the opportunities for 
conflict.252  
 
249 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 
(1991). 
250 See Blair & Stout, supra note 28, at 256-57, 323-24; Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and the 
Corporation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 129 (2009) (discussing how economic theory 
has dominated corporate law and arguing that political theory should play a larger role). 
Public choice theory has been used in corporate law in the context of competition 
between states, competition within states, and competition between the states 
(particularly Delaware) and the federal government. See, e.g., RALPH WINTER, 
GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 
469, 469-73 (1987); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2493 
(2005). 
251 Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 
63 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1397-1404 (2006). 
252 FEDERALIST TEN, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE 
FEDERALIST PAPERS 43 (Gary Wills, ed. 1982) (defining faction as “a number of 
citizens amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated 
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For that reason, examining how voting works in political institutions may 
help illuminate some of the arguments around corporate governance.253 The 
disagreements over corporate governance law, after all, aren’t usually about 
whether corporations should be structured to maximize the preference 
satisfaction of their constituents, broadly defined, but how best to do so. The 
same types of questions animate discussions of both political and corporate 
voting.  
One central set of questions, of course, is which constituents count, and how 
do we identify them and best capture their preferences? But there are other, 
related questions as well. Should the voting system be direct, representative, or 
some mixture of the two? If representative, what is the basis for representation, 
and how responsive should the system be? Work on these questions in the 
political realm can help us think about the structure of governance within the 
corporation. 
 
1.  Interested Parties  
The right to vote is seen as the most basic of political rights.254 Voting is a 
way of integrating preferences into a governance system. Systems that aggregate 
preferences typically limit input to people who have a stake or interest in the 
enterprise.255 When possible, the degree of input may be calibrated with the 
 
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other 
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”); see also David 
Ciepley, Is the U.S. Government a Corporation?: The Corporate Origins of Modern 
Constitutionalism, 111 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 418, 431-32 (2017) (making a connection 
between the structure of corporate charters and colonial charters). 
253 Michael S. Kang, Shareholder Voting As Veto, 88 IND. L.J. 1299, 1345 (2013) 
(analogizing the theory of shareholder voting as veto to consociationalism, a system of 
national governance that permits rival socio-ethnic groups a mutual veto over sensitive 
government policies). 
254 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61 (1971) (describing political liberty 
as “the right to vote and to be eligible for public office”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the 
essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of 
representative government.”). 
255 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 452-56; Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise 
of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213, 251-61 (2003); Melvyn R. Durchslag, 
Salyer, Ball, and Hold: Reappraising the Right to Vote in Terms of Political “Interest” 
and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV 1, 38-39 (1982). 
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weight of that interest, or the strength of those preferences.256 We aggregate the 
preferences of interested parties to ensure more thoughtful decisionmaking and 
lend a measure of legitimacy to electoral outcomes. And, indeed, most 
discussions of governance systems—corporate and political—take it for granted 
that input should be limited to those with an interest in the enterprise.257 After 
that, though, the disagreements start almost immediately. They resolve into a 
couple different issues. First, who has interests that are sufficiently substantial 
to merit some kind of input into the future of the enterprise? Second, how are 
those interests best captured: through mutual agreement, voting, or some 
mixture of the two?258 
The modern corporate structure dictates that the shareholders have their 
preferences captured through voting—primarily by voting on boards of 
directors, but also, in some cases like mergers or dissolutions, more directly—
and all other constituents, from employees to suppliers to customers, have their 
preferences captured largely through individual agreements.259 From the 
perspective of preference aggregation, voting is used to capture an ongoing set 
of preferences that are then translated into a system of governance for the firm. 
As an institutional entity, it needs a process whereby it can make decisions, 
effectuate actions, and carry on business. The shareholders have been designated 
as the body politic whose preferences are collated through various voting 
procedures. 
The basic corporate stakeholders—those with an interest in firm 
decisionmaking—are fairly well known. Employees, shareholders, suppliers, 
customers, contractors, and even the community at large all have interests in the 
operation of a typical corporation. The nature of their interests, of course, may 
vary tremendously between groups and, as we’ve seen before, even within 
groups.260 This is true both with respect to the content of their preferences (what 
they care about) and the strength of the preferences (how much they care). With 
few exceptions, both democratic and economic theorists take the contents of 
preferences as they come. In politics, for example, we don’t prevent people from 
voting because of whom they support or what they believe.261 Standard 
 
256 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 456-58; Hayden, supra note 254, at 248. 
257 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 452-60, 463-64. 
258 These two questions are not unrelated, but in order to think through some of the 
issues here, we think it helps to keep them separated. 
259 See supra, notes 47-49, and accompanying text. 
260 See supra, notes 69-72, and accompanying text. 
261 For example, this is the intuition that underpins Kenneth Arrow’s condition of 
democratic fairness typically referred to as universal admissibility. See Grant M. 
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economics treats preferences much the same way, or, if anything, elevates them 
to an even more exalted position. Revealed preference theory holds that the best 
way to tell what consumers want is to observe their purchasing decisions.262 
Economists do not typically claim that consumers didn’t (or shouldn’t) really 
want something—they just register existing preferences and build their theories 
accordingly.  
The strength of constituent interests is a different matter. While we don’t 
tell citizens or consumers what to care about, we do make basic decisions about 
the structure of governance based on how much we think they care, how much 
they have at stake in the outcome of government or firm decisionmaking. 
Ideally, in both polities and corporations, we figure out who has strong interests 
in the enterprise and assign them the right to vote—a voice in the governance 
process.263 Those with a sufficient level of interest vote; those with even more 
interest may get some type of additional weight added to their vote.264 We 
believe that those with strong preferences about a matter are the ones who 
deserve to have their preferences aggregated.  
Though it makes sense as an initial matter to tie voting to preference 
strength, we immediately run into a problem: we do not have a foolproof way to 
measure the strength of anybody’s preferences.265 We could, of course, just ask 
people how strongly they felt about an election outcome. But, with voting or, 
more generally, governance, tied to interest, people would have an incentive to 
strategically misrepresent the strength of their preferences. And even if we had 
accurate reports from people about how strong their interests were in an election, 
we lack a method of neutrally comparing those reports to those of others who 
report having an interest. There is no universal scale upon which to measure 
 
Hayden, Some Implications of Arrow’s Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
295, 298 (1995); see also WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A 
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF 
SOCIAL CHOICE 217 (1982). 
262 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U. 
L. REV. 4, 4-6 (1994). 
263 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 452-60, 463-64. 
264 See id. at 456-58; Hayden, supra note 254, at 248. 
265 But cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Abby K. Wood, Elite Political Ignorance: Law, 
Data, and the Representation of (Mis)perceived Electorates, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
571, 574 (2018) (noting that “[r]ecent technological developments” and “ever more 
sophisticated machine-learning algorithms to merged voter, consumer, and social media 
databases may, before long, yield a vastly more detailed and accurate picture of voter 
preferences”). 
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people’s preference strength; no way, in other words, to carry out interpersonal 
utility comparisons in a completely objective manner.266  
For these and other reasons, our political system has not generally relied 
upon first-person reports to assess preference strength and, thus, the right to 
participate. Instead, it has relied upon other proxies, or markers, for a person’s 
interest in the outcome of an election.267 Throughout our history, states have 
relied on a wide variety of such markers, such as property-holding, taxpaying, 
or residency.268 Ultimately, the decision is this: whether the person, based on 
certain factors relative to their person, should have the right to participate in 
governance. 
 
2. Marking Interest 
The search for a good marker for voter interest boils down to coming up 
with an indicator that is both accurate and manageable.269 The accuracy of a 
marker is a measure of how well it picks out the group of people who have a 
sufficient interest in the outcome of an election. A marker could be off by either 
including too many people who lack a sufficient interest or excluding people 
who have a strong interest; in other words, it could be overinclusive or 
underinclusive. With an overinclusive marker, we risk extending the franchise 
to those with a weak or nonexistent interest in the election, thus diluting the 
votes of those with a stronger interest. An underinclusive marker is even 
worse—it leads to outright disenfranchisement of those with a real stake in the 
 
266 For a summary of the problem of making interpersonal utility comparisons, see 
Hayden, supra note 260, at 236-47; Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, 
Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and 
Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2129 (1990) (discussing the difficulty 
of “democratic voting rules or procedures for collective decision making [that] would 
be able to aggregate existing individual preference rankings into a single, consistent 
collective outcome”). For more general background in the area, see INTERPERSONAL 
COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991); JAMES 
GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 
113-20 (1986); Peter Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How 
They Are and Should Be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 
200, 238-254 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991). 
267 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 454. 
268 See id. at 454-56; Hayden, supra note 254, at 255-59. Cf. Paul David Meyer, Citizens, 
Residents, and the Body Politic, 102 CAL. L. REV. 465, 468 (2014) (arguing that lawful 
permanent residents should have voting rights). 
269 For an extended discussion of this, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 460-62. 
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outcome.270 When it comes to assigning weight to votes, the accuracy of the 
marker depends on whether and how well it can be calibrated to the strength of 
voter preferences. 
Of course, we have no direct way of assessing the accuracy of any marker 
because, as mentioned above, we have no direct way of measuring and 
comparing preference strength to begin with. Instead, as in any other situation, 
we have to made educated guesses about how much various people are affected 
by the decisionmaking of a particular elected body and make an assumption that 
the people more strongly affected will be those with stronger electoral 
preferences. These judgments about the strength of people’s interest may be 
contested, but they are essential to get any voting system up and running. 
We make these kinds of judgments all the time in the political arena. The 
early freehold requirements, for example, were an attempt to capture one’s stake 
in an election, and they were fine as far as they went (that is, those with a large 
amount of property did have an interest in elections), but they were 
underinclusive, disenfranchising large numbers of property-less people who 
were, nonetheless, also greatly affected by the exercise of governmental 
powers.271 More contemporary requirements, such as residency and citizenship, 
seem like better (though still imperfect) markers of voter interest. For example, 
those who are residents within the jurisdiction of a particular government are 
subject to its police powers, taxation, and services, and thus have quite a bit at 
stake in an election. Residency isn’t perfect, of course. It’s a little 
underinclusive, in that it fails to capture those who work or own property in one 
place and reside in another. At times, it can also be overinclusive, as when it 
allows people to vote who plan to move out of town right after election day. But 
despite debates around the margins, most agree that residency is a more accurate 
marker for voter interest than, say, owning property.272 And, in the United States, 
when state and local governments tinker too much and try to use markers that 
are too overinclusive or underinclusive, they are often disallowed from doing so 
for that very reason. New York, for example, attempted to limit voting in certain 
school district elections to people who either had school-aged children or owned 
or leased taxable property in the district.273 The U.S. Supreme Court 
acknowledged that voting may be tied to interest, but struck these particular 
 
270 See id. Of course, we could stitch together more than one underinclusive marker and 
better capture voter interest. 
271 See id. at 461. 
272 See id. 
273 See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
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markers as both overinclusive and underinclusive,274 explaining, that “[s]tatutes 
granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of 
denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which 
substantially affect their lives.”275  
Of course, we could always come up with some more extensive survey of 
voter interest to get a better fix on whether any particular person has a strong 
interest in the outcome of an election.276 For example, perhaps a survey reveals 
that while both Luke and Ben are residents of a certain town, Ben plans to move 
away in just a few weeks. A third potential voter, Milo, lives nearby, but works 
and owns property in town, including the house where his elderly, dependent 
mother lives. With such information, we might conclude that, while residency is 
a good starting point, our additional information reveals that, really, Luke and 
Milo have sufficient interest in the jurisdiction to vote, and Ben, despite his 
current residency, does not. But this kind of individualized preference 
information would be incredibly costly to obtain, much less keep up to date. 
And, of course, if we obtain this information by asking everyone about their 
interests, we’d worry about strategic misrepresentation.277 But, in any case, an 
ongoing process of surveying everyone about their potential interests in every 
jurisdiction is simply unworkable, which brings us to the second feature of any 
good marker: its manageability.278 
Democratic institutions have long valued markers for voter interest that are 
easily managed. The property-holding and taxpaying requirements of old were 
not only useful because they ensured that voters had a financial stake in election 
outcomes, they did so with information that was readily available to the state. In 
fact, the state and local governments that ran the elections usually had lists of 
both property holders and taxpayers, which made it very easy to administer the 
voter rolls.279 Residency has been a little harder to pin down—state and local 
governments do not, usually, have ready lists of all of their residents—so 
residency is often confirmed by requesting some sort of identification with a 
name and address on it (a utility bill, for example); if one’s residency is 
questioned, it is ultimately something that can be easily confirmed. 
Manageability, then, is a key feature of any marker used to pick out a potential 
voter’s interest in the outcome of an election. 
 
274 Id. at 632 n.15. 
275 Id. at 626-27. 
276 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 24, at 462. 
277 See id. 
278 See id. at 461. 
279 See id. 
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B. Who Should Vote? 
  Developing a method of aggregating individual preferences, then, demands 
that we first figure out whose preferences to aggregate. This typically involves 
finding some way to measure the level of interest that a potential voter has in the 
outcome of an election. Because we do not have direct. reliable access to that 
kind of information, we usually depend upon some sort of marker for that 
interest. We generally divide the electorate into those whose preferences can be 
expressed through voting, and those who preferences cannot. Until now, 
corporate governance has allowed only shareholders to express their preferences 
through votes. But it is time to reexamine this reality.  
As detailed earlier, the longstanding theory of the firm counsels that two 
groups of constituents—shareholders and employees—have a special 
relationship to the corporation that militates in favor of assigning voting rights 
to them. This gives us symmetry between contribution and participation. In this 
part, we argue that core features of democratic theory—the tie between voting 
and interest and the accompanying need for markers of that interest—point in 
the same direction. Here, too, there are features of shareholders and employees 
that allow us to distinguish them from other stakeholders. Most simply, their 
relationship with the firm gives them the accurate and manageable markers of 
interest that other corporate constituents, in ordinary business situations, lack.  
 
1.  Shareholders 
For shareholders, the value of the capital contribution and the percentage of 
the dividend interest provide fairly quantifiable measures of the shareholder’s 
interest in the corporation. Putting aside any outside interests of the shareholder, 
the allocation of one vote for each share accurately correlates to the 
shareholder’s financial interest in the corporation.280 The system of one share, 
one vote calibrates the level of interest with the level of input. Shareholding, in 
other words, appears to be both an accurate and manageable marker of interest 
in a corporation, and thus shareholders should be accorded voting rights. 
However, the familiarity of this conclusion belies the complicating factors 
to this democratic argument for shareholder voting. Although shares are 
originally sold for the same price during the initial public offering, publicly-
 
280 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 72 (“The most basic statutory voting 
rule is the same in every state. It is this: all common shares vote, all votes have the same 
weights, and no other participant in the venture votes, unless there is some agreement 
to the contrary. Such agreements are rare.”). 
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traded shares soon enter the marketplace, where their values may change 
drastically over time. One shareholder may have purchased Facebook shares for 
$30 in 2012, while recent shareholders may have paid over $200.281 Although 
everyone’s shares may have the same value at any given moment in time, 
individual shareholders have likely invested different amounts per share to 
obtain those shares (and votes). 
Shareholders also have differing interests outside the firm. Those interests 
may swamp the shareholder’s interest in the corporation’s residual. Shareholders 
may tailor their financial holdings to match shareholder voting power with 
countervailing interests in derivatives or short positions.282 They may have 
personal interests, such as family ties283 or religious and political values,284 that 
conflict with the principle of shareholder wealth maximization. The 
shareholders themselves may be social investing funds285 or sovereign wealth 
funds286 or an algorithm.287 Pension funds may want to promote worker power, 
while hedge funds may want to make a quick sale after juicing up the price. 
Shareholders do not have “pure” interests as shareholders, no more than citizens 
have “pure” interests in the republic.  
There is also an accuracy issue when it comes to measuring shareholder 
preferences in that it may not be worth the shareholder’s time and investment to 
correlate the vote in question accurately with the shareholder’s preferences. The 
shareholder interest for those holding only a few shares is rather weak. The move 
to passive index funds further removes the shareholder’s interests from any 
 
281 Cf. Matt Phillips, Facebook’s Stock Plunge Shatters Faith in Tech Companies’ 
Invincibility, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/business/facebook-stock-earnings-call.html. 
282 See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 816 (2006); Shaun Martin & 
Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 780 (2005) (discussing 
“economically encumbered” and “legally encumbered” shares). 
283 Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1185 (2013). 
284 See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 733 (2005). 
285 See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and 
Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, STAN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
286 See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate 
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345 
(2008). 
287 See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 680 (2013). 
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effort to express those interests through a vote.288 Fully diversified shareholders 
are close to indifferent to the fortunes of any particular corporation.  
There are also underappreciated difficulties in the manageability of 
shareholder voting. Shareholder governance is still centered around the idea of 
the annual shareholders meeting, which shareholders in theory are expected to 
attend.289 If unable to attend, shareholders designate their voting power to 
proxies, who then act on their behalf. Shareholders receive proxy ballots from 
the incumbent board, which makes the process much easier while subverting its 
democratic nature. Add to this the fact that modern shareholding is generally 
managed through intermediaries who hold the shares on behalf of the actual 
owner.290 As Ewan McGaughey pointed out, it’s quite often the case that “[a]sset 
managers control shareholder voting rights with other people’s money.”291 
Confusion over voting rights can abound in the context of custodial ownership, 
short sales, lending shares, and changes in ownership after the record date.292 
Trading shares is also accomplished through lightning-fast technology, and the 
allocation of particular shares to particular holders has not caught up with this 
technology.293 Although certain reforms may address particular uncertainties 
 
288 See Lund, supra note 6, at 497 (proposing that lawmakers should restrict truly 
passive funds from voting at shareholder meetings because of their lack of interests in 
voting). 
289 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Case Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections 
and Shareholders' Meetings, 74 TENN. L. REV. 199, 201 (2007) (discussing the 
“mandatory requirement under state corporate law and stock exchange listing standards 
that public corporations hold annual shareholders' meetings for the election of 
director”). 
290 Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections 
on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in A More Rational System of Corporate 
Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 6-7 (2007) (discussing the “separation of ownership from 
ownership,” namely that “the equity of public corporations is often owned, not by the 
end-user investors, but by another form of agency, a mutual fund, or other institutional 
investor”). 
291 Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in America at Work: The History of Labor’s Vote in 
Corporate Governance, 42 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 697, 746 (2019). 
292 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 1227, 1231 (2008) (“The inescapable complexity combined with the already well-
studied issues of shareholders’ rational apathy and free rider problems detract from the 
case for shareholder voting.”). 
293 George Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 228-
29 (2019) (noting the failure to connect particular shares with their owners in the context 
of electronic trading). 
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over voting rights for particular shares,294 there remain difficulties in matching 
up particular shareholders with voting rights in a particular election. 
But despite these concerns, shareholders have sufficiently defined interests 
to provide accurate and manageable markers for their voting rights. They have 
a clear stake in the outcome of decisionmaking. They have a straightforward 
way to calibrate the strength of their interest. And because shareholders provide 
unencumbered capital to the corporation in exchange for certain rights to the 
residual profits, they cannot register their preferences meaningfully through 
agreement alone; they need a governance mechanism. Shareholder voting rights 
are designed to manage those preferences.  
 
2. Employees 
Employment is also an accurate and manageable marker of interest in the 
success of a corporation. Employees have an interest in the value of the 
corporation as expressed through their continued employment. A worker 
contributes to the process of joint production through her labor and creates both 
specific value (creation of a particular good or service) and longer-term 
indefinite value (the value of the ongoing business as expressed through good 
will, trademark, and share price). Employees receive wages and benefits and 
may, in some cases, participate as shareholders through a 401(k) plan. But they 
also have an interest in the ongoing business of the company simply by virtue of 
having a job. This job renders them participants in the ongoing production and 
entitles them to have a voice in the joint production process through the 
governance of the firm. 
As compared with shareholders, it is both easier and more difficult to 
correlate employment interests with a schema of voting rights within the firm. 
Employees are smaller in number, easier to keep track of, and have an 
attachment to the firm that makes the logistics of election participation easier to 
manage. At the same time, there are more factors that could complicate the 
assignment of particular voting interests to employees. First, the category of 
employment is less clearly defined than the category of shareholder. The test for 
“employment” has traditionally been the common-law control test, which asks 
whether the employer has the right to control the action of the employee within 
the scope of employment.295 The test has uncertain boundaries and can result in 
 
294 Id. 
295 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1958) (defining a 
servant/employee as: “a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3441307
 
 
 
62                                                      LAW REVIEW                                             [Vol. 100 
 
uncertainty over whether a particular worker is an employee or an independent 
contractor.296 At the same time, however, corporations officially designate their 
employees for tax purposes and withhold employee income taxes.297 This tax 
designation would be a relatively straightforward way to delineate employees in 
the first instance, and then workers could contest that designation if they felt 
improperly excluded from the employment rolls. 
Corporations may also struggle over the specific voting rights to be granted 
to each employee. The easiest system to administer would allocate one set of 
voting rights to each employee. But employees might object to this allocation 
along a variety of lines, arguing instead that employees with more seniority, 
higher wages, more hours, or greater stature within the company deserve greater 
voting rights. Unlike a unit of shares, a unit of “employment” is not the same for 
each employee in terms of interest in the firm. The conflict over the allocation 
of employee voting rights is one reason why commentators have argued against 
them.298  
But this disparity between shareholders and employees can also be 
overstated. As discussed above, shareholder voting rights are not always 
allocated along the lines of “one share, one vote.” Many of the largest and most 
prominent companies—Google, Facebook, Viacom—have allocated voting 
rights disproportionately among shareholder groups to give a group of founders, 
family members, or insiders more power relative to their fellow stockholders. 
 
and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is 
subject to the other’s control or right to control”). 
296 Id. § 220 cmt. c (noting that the employment relationship is “one not capable of exact 
definition”); Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 661, 682-83 (2013) (“Courts and commentators continue to bemoan [the 
control test’s] inability to deliver clear answers.”). 
297 Firms are expected to differentiate between employees and independent contractors 
over a host of provisions, including whether taxes need to be withheld, 26 U.S.C. §§ 
3401(c), 3402 (2018), whether the firm must pay a share of Social Security and 
Medicare (FICA), id. §§ 3101, 3121(d), and unemployment (FUTA) taxes, id. §§ 3301, 
3306(i), for the worker, and whether the workers count as employees for benefit plan 
purposes. Id. § 410(a). The IRS defines employees based on the common law control 
test. Id. § 3121(d)(2) (defining an employee as, among other definitions, “any individual 
who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-
employee relationship, has the status of an employee”).  
298 HANSMANN, supra note 82; Henry Hansmann, Employee Ownership and Unions: 
Lessons from the Airline Industry, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING 
WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 573-80 
(Samuel Estreicher, ed., Kluwer Law International, 1998). 
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These companies made this choice based on competing interests in providing 
more governance to a select group based on that group’s role within the firm.299 
Similar analyses could apply in the employee voting rights context: the company 
could design a system of voting rights based on the relative importance of 
employee voice to the company.300 For now, corporations would face the choice 
of a straightforward allocation of employee voting rights—one employee, one 
vote—or decide to assign voting rights based on a more nuanced analysis of 
employee interests. 
One other structural concern with adding employee voting rights into the 
corporate governance mix is their potential incommensurability with 
shareholder voting rights. If we have one share, one vote on one side, and one 
employee, one vote on the other, how will we match up these two systems? How 
many shares’ worth of votes will one employee have? But matching up two sets 
of voters is by no means impossible, and it’s certainly not a reason to shut out a 
group of otherwise qualified constituents out of board elections.  
When it comes to allocating voting power between shareholders and 
employees, we imagine that most corporations would want to take one of two 
approaches. The first would provide for separate systems of voting rights in 
which there would be no need to measure commensurability. So, for example, 
shareholders would vote for a set of shareholder directors, and employee would 
vote for a set of employee directors. The voting rights would not need to be 
commensurable as they would be participating in different elections. Both the 
German system of codetermination301 and bills recently introduced in the U.S. 
Senate track this approach.302 
The second possible system would combine shareholders and employees 
into a single electorate. The corporation would then have to make a judgment 
 
299 See Lund, supra note 8, at 714-37 (discussing the benefits of a disproportionate 
voting structure). 
300 Recent innovations in employee participatory governance structures include 
holacracy and other participatory (or “evolutionary”) management structures. See 
LALOUX, supra note 15; ROBERTSON, supra note 15. 
301 Andreas Rühmkorf, Company law and corporate governance in Germany: From 
stakeholder value to corporate sustainability?, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY (Beate Sjåfell & 
Christopher Bruner eds., 2019); Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination Bargains: 
The History of German Corporate and Labor Law, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 135, 136 
(2016). 
302 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018); Reward Work Act, S. 
2605, 115th Cong. (2018). 
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about how to weight the votes of individual shareholders and employees. 
Corporations following this approach would probably start with a judgement 
about the general allocation of voting power between shareholders and 
employees, and then translate that into individual voting weights. So, for 
example, a corporation could decide that employees should have roughly forty 
percent303 of the voting rights within the corporation, and then allocate votes 
between the two groups based on this rough proportion.304 
At this stage, it’s enough to say that the logistical challenges are not 
insurmountable.305 More importantly, they do not justify the exclusion of a set 
of corporate participants from participation in governance. Employees are 
participants in the firm and contribute their efforts to the process of joint 
production. They should not be excluded from governance simply because we 
currently have systems in place that find it easier to exclude them. 
 
3. Other Corporate Constituents 
The theory of the firm and democratic participation theory both counsel in 
favor of extending the corporate franchise to shareholders and employees. Those 
two groups deserve voting rights because they are within the economic firm—
they participate in a process of joint production as carried on by the firm. They 
also have the accurate and manageable markers of interest that allow for the 
creation of a workable system of corporate governance. The same, however, 
cannot be said of other corporate constituents. 
Along with the theory of the firm, democratic participation theory provides 
a second means of separating the insiders—shareholders and employees—from 
other constituents outside the corporation. With most firms, it doesn’t make 
sense to capture the preferences of creditors, customers, suppliers, and other 
constituencies though the franchise. This is both because their interests in the 
success of the firm are not as significant as those of the insiders and because 
their status and relationship with the firm do not provide particularly accurate or 
 
303 Cf. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018) (assigning employees 
with voting rights to 40% of the board). 
304 One problem with this type of system is that if one group or the other has a majority 
of the votes, they can completely dictate the outcomes of winner-take-all elections. 
305 The mixed interests of employees and shareholders comes into play in startup 
companies, where founders and employees generally have equity positions along with 
wages and benefits.  For a discussion of the unique governance challenges in new 
companies poised for growth, see Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. 
L. REV. 155 (2019). 
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manageable markers of that interest. For those reasons, participation theory 
generally counsels against extending the franchise to these outside stakeholders. 
Take, for example, the customers of a large corporation. Customers 
certainly have some relationship with a firm such that they have a stake in, and 
preferences regarding, its success. But their interest in the continued success of 
the company is more tenuous, and their ongoing contacts with the company, 
even assuming the planned obsolescence of the latest product, are likely to be 
relatively sporadic. Their status as customers is not a particularly strong marker 
for interest in the future success of the firm. It’s also not a particularly 
manageable marker, given that the company’s interaction with the person may 
be limited to the point of sale, if that; after that, tracking the customers becomes 
more difficult.306 The same may be said of a corporation’s suppliers, though the 
relationship may be a little closer there, and the markers a little more 
manageable. Similarly, creditors may have manageable markers—amount of 
debt, for example—but they have structured their capital investment as 
repayable and often secured, while shareholders have provided their equity 
contributions with no expectation of repayment. 
  Of course, there may be certain types of customers, suppliers, or even 
creditors who enjoy a continuous and significant relationship with a corporation 
such that they have a more significant interest and it’s more manageable to 
identify them for the purpose of extending the franchise. Some utility customers, 
for example, have that kind of relationship with their providers.307 And in those 
situations, democratic participation theory may counsel in favor of extending 
them voting rights.308  
 
306 This may change with the increased online interaction between consumers and 
producers, particularly on social media. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF 
SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 135-37 (2019). 
307 HANSMANN, supra note 82, at 168-73 (discussing how rural electrical cooperatives 
involve ownership by customers); Yosifon, Lock-In, supra note 202, at 1449-59 
(arguing that consumers may have ongoing interests through lock-in purchases). 
308 In the nineteenth century, shares in companies providing vital infrastructure services 
such as transportation, banking, and insurance were often purchased by local merchants 
and farmers who used those services. These low-stakes shareholders were protected by 
restricted voting schemes which gave their shares more power within the governance 
structure. Scholars have debated whether these protections were more a form of investor 
protection or consumer protection. Compare Dunlavy, supra note 33, at 1354-56 
(investor protection), with Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of 
Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 953-54 
(2014) (consumer protection). 
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Democratic participation theory is certainly flexible enough to deal with 
unique customer bases and the possible rise of accurate and manageable markers 
of constituent interest, and assign voting rights accordingly.309 For now, though, 
in the regular course of corporate governance, it militates in favor of extending 
voting rights to shareholders and employees and leaving the interests of other 
constituents to contract or government regulation.  
  
C.  The German Experience 
Shareholder primacy is so deeply entrenched in American corporate law and 
scholarship that it’s sometimes difficult to imagine any other way of thinking 
about the corporation. This lack of imagination may help explain why arguments 
for the shareholder franchise—despite their shortcomings—continue to plod 
along in the background of an awful lot of scholarship. There are, however, 
alternative models, some of which involve employee representation. 
The United States may not have much of a history of employee involvement 
in corporate governance,310 but a majority of European Union and OECD 
countries give employees access to corporate boards.311 Of these, Germany’s 
system of codetermination is perhaps the most well-known.312 It has also been 
 
309 See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 219, at 124 (discussing the use of voting rights to 
manage stakeholder interests within socially-oriented business enterprises). 
310 For a comprehensive rundown, see Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in America at 
Work: The History of Labor’s Vote in Corporate Governance, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
697 (2019). 
311 For a recent list of countries, see Ewan McGaughey, Votes at Work in Britain: 
Shareholder Monopolisation and the “Single Channel,” 47 INDUS. L.J. 76, 79-80, 79 
n.17, & 80 fig.1 (2018). For information on countries outside of Germany, see Klas 
Levinson, Codetermination in Sweden: Myth and Reality, 21 ECON. & INDUS. DEM. 457 
(2000); Caspar Rose, The Challenges of Employee-Appointed Board Members for 
Corporate Governance: The Danish Evidence, 9 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 215 (2008); 
Milan Utroša, Works Councils and Co-Determination in Slovenia, 1 SE EUR. REV. 23 
(1998); Eivind Falkum, Inger M. Hagen & Sissel C. Trygstad, Participation and 
Codetermination among Norwegian Employees – State of the Art 2009, Conference 
Paper, 9th IIRA European Congress, June-July 2010, Copenhagen, available at: 
https://faos.ku.dk/pdf/iirakongres2010/track2/38.pdf/.  
312 The term “codetermination” actually describes two very different features of German 
corporations, and we are using the terminology from Otto Sandrock & Jean J. du Plessis, 
The German System of Supervisory Codetermination by Employees, in GERMAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 167, 169 
(Jean J. du Plessis et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017). “Social codetermination” involves employee 
representation on shop-level works councils at all companies with at least five 
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in place for decades as part of a large, modern economy, making it an 
exemplar.313 
Codetermination laws dictate the composition of the supervisory boards for 
large German companies.314 The degree of employee representation depends on 
a number of factors, including the type of industry, the number of employees, 
and a few other factors.315 Generally speaking, corporations with fewer than 500 
employees have supervisory board members elected by shareholders; 
corporations with 500 to 2000 employees must have one-third of their board 
members elected by employees; and those with more than 2000 employees have 
one-half of their supervisory board members elected by employees.316 Thus, in 
 
employees. See id. at 169-71. “Supervisory codetermination,” on the other hand, 
describes employee representation at the level of the corporate board. See id. at 169.  
313 See Robert Scholz & Sigurt Vitols, Board-level codetermination: A Driving Force 
for Corporate Social Responsibility in German Companies?, 25 EUR. J. IND. REL. 233, 
233-34 (2019).  
314 See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 312, at 172-78. Germany uses a two-tiered 
board system. See Jean J. du Plessis et al., An Overview of German Business or 
Enterprise Law and the One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems Contrasted, in GERMAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 
312, at 1, 8-13. Supervisory boards are roughly analogous to corporate boards in the 
United States, exercising general oversight of the company and appointing members of 
the management board. See Jean J. du Plessis & Otto Saenger, The Supervisory Board 
as Company Organ, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 312, at 105, 133-53; Jean J. du Plessis & Otto 
Saenger, The General Meeting and the Management Board as Company Organs, in 
GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, 
supra note 312, at 63, 73. The management board, much like the officers in the United 
States, run the company and make the day-to-day business decisions. Thilo Kuntz, 
German Corporate Law in the 20th Century, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 205 (Harwell Wells ed., 2018). 
315 See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 312, at 182-83. 
316 See Jean J. du Plessis & Ingo Saenger, An Overview of the Corporate Governance 
Debate in Germany, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 312, at 17, 48-49; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 
312, at 173-78; JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMICS OF CODETERMINATION: LESSONS 
FROM THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 103 (2009); Otto Sandrock, German and 
International Perspectives of the German Model of Codetermination, 26 EUR. BUS. L. 
REV. 129, 131-32 (2015). In most of these large companies with one-half 
codetermination, employees enjoy “quasi-parity” because shareholders elect the chair 
(and potential tiebreaker vote). In the coal, iron, and steel industries, however, there is 
a neutral chair (and tiebreaker), giving the employees “full parity,” or a truly shared 
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Germany, we have a longstanding example of shared corporate governance, with 
shareholder and employee representatives working side by side on the 
supervisory boards of major companies.  
For decades, codetermination has received little more than passing attention 
from American corporate governance scholars.317 It shows up most often in a 
variant of the contractarian argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise. 
Codetermination, it is argued, must be inefficient because it has not been 
voluntarily adopted by American firms. In fact, the only way a firm would end 
up with employee board representation is if you force it to do so, as Germany 
does by law. Nobody freely chooses codetermination; it is therefore less efficient 
than having shareholders run the show.318 
 
system of governance. See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 312, at 173-76. This is 
true of companies in these sectors at a lower threshold—1000 instead of 2000 
employees. Volkswagen is a special case. Along with 50 percent representation for the 
workers, the government of Lower Saxony also has seats on the board, which gives the 
workers a de facto majority (because of traditional government support for the workers). 
In addition, the voting rights of individual shareholders are limited to a maximum of 20 
percent for any particular shareholder. Law of 21 July 1960 on the privatisation of 
equity in the Volkswagenwerk limited company (Gesetz über die Überführung der 
Anteilsrechte an der Volkswagenwerk Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in private 
Hand, BGBl. 1960 I, p. 585, and BGBl. 1960 III, p. 641-1-1); JACK EWING, FASTER, 
HIGHER, FARTHER: THE VOLKSWAGEN SCANDAL 57 (2017), 
317 See, e.g., CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 295-96 (Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk ed., 1990) (one passing reference to codetermination); EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 69 (again, one passing reference to codetermination); 
HANSMANN, supra note 82, at 110-12 (1996) (a few pages); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 
88, at 47-49 (a few pages); JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 230 (2008) (some passing references to the 
German system). But see EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163-235 
(Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (a lengthy examination of 
codetermination). 
318 The argument may have been first (and in any case, most forcefully) made by 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling in the late 1970s. Michael C. Jensen & William 
H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed 
Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469, 473-75, 503-04 (1979). Many other 
scholars have made variants of the same point. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational Failures Analysis, 
23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1054 (1998) (noting that “German codetermination was 
created by sweeping statutory mandates” and concluding it was unlikely to be adopted 
through private ordering); George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea 
Getting Worse, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1115 (2008); Hansmann & Kraakman, 
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In the last few years, however, the key assumption underlying the 
argument—that codetermination can only arise through fiat, not voluntary 
agreement—has itself been revealed to be false. Ewan McGaughey, a legal 
historian and economist, recently showed that German codetermination first 
arose through collective agreements and only later was enacted into law.319 This 
history shows that the American law-and-economics scholars are not just wrong 
on this point, but may have the picture completely backwards: German 
codetermination was created by agreement not once but twice, while the law was 
sometimes used to quash it.320 There are also many reasons to believe that a 
shared system of government might not emerge from a free market of industrial 
relations even if it is more efficient than the existing system.321 
Theoretical arguments aside, how well has codetermination worked in 
Germany? Much of the scholarship evaluating the system has centered on its 
role in promoting broader goals such as social cohesion and fairness.322 The 
bottom-line, economic effects of codetermination are either seen as secondary 
or as necessarily following from the achievement of these societal goals.323 That 
is, codetermination is viewed less in terms of an economic system than as one 
designed to promote a well-functioning democracy and help prevent social 
 
supra note 2, at 445 (“The growing view today is that meaningful direct worker voting 
participation in corporate affairs tends to produce inefficient decisions, paralysis, or 
weak boards, and that these costs are likely to exceed any potential benefits that worker 
participation might bring.”); Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Renier Kraakman & 
Mariana Pargendler, The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-
Shareholder Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 79, 106 (John Armour et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017); ROBERTA 
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 129-30 (1993). 
319 See Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination Bargains: The History of German 
Corporate and Labor Law, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 135 (2016). 
320 See id. at 170. 
321 See, e.g., Simon Renaud, Dynamic Efficiency of Supervisory Board Codetermination 
in Germany, 21 LABOUR 689 (2007) (arguing that codetermination may not emerge 
because allocation and distribution may not be separated, information asymmetries may 
exist, and transaction costs in introducing such a system may be too high); David I. 
Levine & Laura D. Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and the Firm’s Environment, in 
PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 183 (Alan S. Blinder, ed. 
1990) (arguing that codetermination needs to be adopted on a broad scale because 
individual firms may find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma with regard to their 
existing entitlements and constituents). 
322 See ADDISON, supra note 316, at 2. 
323 See id. 
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division—in particular, the division between labor and capital. And, on this 
broad level, it is thought to be quite successful.  
There are, however, a number of studies assessing the economic effects of 
codetermination, with a consensus that has shifted back and forth over the last 
four decades.324 Some early studies from the 1980s found that codetermination 
had very little impact on corporate performance.325 Those studies, however, 
were criticized on a number of methodological grounds,326 and several more 
sophisticated evaluations in the 1990s and early 2000s gave a more pessimistic 
account, finding that codetermination was associated with, among other things, 
lower productivity and lower profits.327 That consensus, though, soon gave way 
to a third phase in the literature, one that both reversed the principal findings of 
the second-phase studies (finding them to be artifacts of a particular method of 
 
324 For the best summary of the literature through 2008 and a discussion of the three 
initial phases of research detailed below, see id. at 108-121; see also Uwe Jirjahn, 
Ökonomische Wirkungen der Mitbestimmung in Deutschland: Ein Update, 
ARBEITSPAPIER 186, Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung (Feb. 2010). 
325 See, e.g., Jan Svejnar, Relative Wage Effects of Unions, Dictatorship, and Co-
determination: Econometric Evidence from Germany, 63 REV. ECON. & STATS. 188 
(1981) (finding codetermination associated with higher earnings in the iron and steel 
industry but not in the coal mining industry); Guiseppe Benelli et al., Labor 
Participation in Corporate Policy-Making Decisions: West Germany’s Experience with 
Codetermination, 60 J. BUS. 553 (1987) (finding no real differences between firms with 
codetermination and without codetermination across a variety of measures of 
performance); Michael A. Gurdon & Anoop Rai, Codetermination and Enterprise 
Performance: Empirical Evidence from West Germany, 42 J. ECON. & BUS. 289 (1990) 
(finding codetermination led to higher profitability but lower productivity). 
326 See ADDISON, supra note 316, at 109. Those early studies were criticized for reasons 
that included “sample size, data frequency (in the case of stock returns), lack of controls 
for other relevant economic or organizational variables, focus on a single event, and 
narrow reach.” Id. 
327 See, e.g., Felix FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Economic Effects of Codetermination, 
95 SCAND. J. ECON. 365 (1993) (finding that the shift to quasi-parity codetermination 
in 1976 had negative effect on productivity); Theodor Baums & Bernd Frick, Co-
determination in Germany: The Impact of Court Decisions on the Market Value of 
Firms, 1 ECON. ANALYSIS 143 (1998) (finding that court rulings that expanded or 
restricted codetermination had no real effect on share price); Gary Gorton & Frank A. 
Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of Codetermination, 2 J. EURO. ECON. 
ASS’N 863 (2004) (finding that moving from one-third to quasi-parity codetermination 
negatively affected shareholder wealth). 
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assessment)328 and found that codetermination was also modestly associated 
with greater innovation.329 These more optimistic assessments were bolstered by 
a couple of modern financial studies on the market value of the firm, which 
found that “prudent” levels of employee representation led to better board 
decisionmaking by improving monitoring and thus reducing agency costs.330 
This third, rather optimistic phase of assessment brought us right up to one of 
the most profound tests of all systems of corporate governance: the global 
financial crisis. 
The financial crisis did not spare any of the world’s major economies, but 
some recovered more quickly than others. Germany, in particular, recovered 
more quickly and more thoroughly than many other countries, and did so, at least 
in part, because of its corporate governance model.331 While economic 
downturns are always difficult for companies and their employees, 
codetermination allows the management of many companies “to more easily 
seek the consent of its workforce for carrying out more or less drastic 
measures.”332 These measures include a system (Kurzarbeit) that temporarily 
reduces the working hours (and salaries) of many of the employees.333 This 
avoids painful layoffs and allows companies to retain their core workforces, 
which in turn allowed the economy as a whole to avoid the worst of the 
economic slump.334 This led one group of scholars to conclude: “Particular to 
 
328 See, e.g., Felix FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Co-determination, Efficiency, and 
Productivity, 43 BRIT. J. IND. REL. 233 (2005); see also ADDISON, supra note 316, at 
115-16, 120. The negative findings in the second phase of studies may have been 
artefacts of the cross-section estimation they used, which (by definition) did not control 
for firm heterogeneity or firm-specific effects. Id. at 115, 120. 
329 See, e.g., Kornelius Kraft et al., Codetermination and Innovation, 35 CAMBRIDGE J. 
ECON. 145 (2011); see also ADDISON, supra note 316, at 116. 
330 See Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance Include 
Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 
673 (2006); see also Simon Renaud, Dynamic Efficiency of Supervisory Board 
Codetermination in Germany, 21 LABOUR 689 (2007). 
331 See Jean J. du Plessis et al., Preface to GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 314, at vii; Sandrock, supra 
note 316, at 136. For some brief comparisons of the German recovery to that of other 
countries, see Michael Burda & Jennifer Hunt, What Explains the German Labor 
Market Miracle in the Great Recession?, 2011 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY 273-75. 
332 See Sandrock, supra note 316, at 134. 
333 See id.; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 311, at 188-89, 193. 
334 See Lutz Bellman et al., The German Labour Market Puzzle in the Great Recession, 
in PRODUCTIVITY PUZZLES ACROSS EUROPE 187, 187-88 (Philippe Askenazy et al. 
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Germany was the social partners’ willingness to work together during this 
specific economic hardship. . . . it cannot be denied that the quality of industrial 
relations was a factor in overcoming the crisis.”335 
A number of new studies came out during and after the period of recovery 
that were consistent with the third phase of the literature, showing that 
codetermination generally had positive economic effects for a variety of 
constituents, including shareholders. One of the stronger results in that regard 
came from a 2019 study by Simon Jager, Benjamin Schoefer, and Jörg Heining, 
which showed that shared governance was “associated with an increase in 
capital formation and a shift towards more capital intensive production,” 
probably because it facilitated cooperation between firms and their 
employees.336 Shareholders, it turns out, may be better off investing in firms 
where employees have a stronger governance role. 
Employees, too, fared better (by their own measures) under 
codetermination. A recent study by E. Han Kim, Ernst Maug, and Christoph 
Scheider confirmed that employees at full-parity codetermined firms are better 
protected against layoffs during industry downturns.337 This job security, 
however, comes at the price of significantly lower wages. Employees at 
codetermined firms pay a premium equal to 3.3 percent of their wages for this 
employment insurance.338 Importantly, this swap of wages for job security has 
no effect on shareholders one way or the other.339  
 
eds., 2016); Sandrock, supra note 316, at 134; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 312, 
at 188-89, 193. 
335 Bellman et al., supra note 334, at 229. 
336 See Simon Jager, Benjamin Schoefer & Jörg Heining, Labor in the Boardroom 28-
29, available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/17273 (unpublished manuscript) 
(emphasis added). 
337 E. Han Kim, Ernst Maug & Christoph Scheider, Labor Representation in 
Governance as an Insurance Mechanism, 2018 REV. FIN. 1251, 1286. 
338 Id. at 1279, 1286. The benefit of this employment insurance was really only 
experienced by white-collar and skilled blue-collar employees; unskilled blue-collar 
workers do not receive much in the way of job security protections. Id. at 1286. The 
authors of the study attribute this finding to the lack of real representation of unskilled 
workers on supervisory boards. Id. 
339 Id. at 1286. A similar finding was made in another recent paper. See Jager, Schoefer 
& Heining, supra note 336, at 28 (concluding “we did not find that installing worker 
representatives in German supervisory boards increased wages in these firms, nor did it 
lead to more rent sharing”). 
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Codetermination also benefits other corporate constituents, usually because 
their interests line up with those of employees. Employee representation, for 
example, turns out to be good for creditors because both groups are keenly 
interested in the stability and long-term survival of the firm.340 Codetermination 
is also positively related to a firm’s commitment to substantive corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) measures, including setting concrete goals on emission 
reductions, the publication of a separate CSR report (or section in its annual 
report), and the presence of a job security (no-layoff) policy.341 These kinds of 
secondary effects, along with recent performance of the German economy, may 
have begun to change the way people view codetermination. Indeed, by 2016, 
its popularity among the German people rose to an all-time high.342 
So what does all this mean? To start with, the success of the German system 
serves as an empirical rejoinder to the hypothetical arguments used by law and 
economics scholars to justify the exclusive shareholder franchise. 
Codetermination was born of consensual agreement at a time when labor and 
capital had roughly equal bargaining power, and only later became enshrined in 
law. German firms have not been paralyzed by more heterogeneous board 
electorates. And they have not been destroyed by voting cycles. As discussed in 
Part II, the arguments against employee representation were already in trouble 
on their own theoretical terms; the presence of a significant, well-functioning 
counterexample should be decisive. Those committed to the proposition that 
economic and social choice theory somehow dictate the exclusive shareholder 
franchise need to overhaul their old arguments or come up with some new ones. 
Codetermination also serves as a kind of proof-of-concept when it comes to 
our model of shared corporate governance. The arguments we make in favor of 
adding employee representatives to corporate boards, just as the arguments 
against, are largely theoretical. They necessarily sweep quite broadly, and don’t 
attend to many of the mechanical details of how to best structure a shared 
governance system, much less how to get from here to there. Germany provides 
an example of how such a system might work. And recent research suggests that 
it’s working quite well for a variety of corporate constituents, including 
shareholders.  
 
  
 
340 Chen Lin, Thomas Schmid & Yuhai Xuan, Employee Representation and Financial 
Leverage, 127 J. FIN. ECON. 303, 321 (2018). 
341 See id. at 43-44. 
342 See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 312, at 188. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
We have reached a critical point in the development of the corporation. 
Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for 
ways to express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Employees are 
agitating for greater say at their workplaces—resisting mandatory arbitration 
clauses, objecting to corporate expressions of political and religious views, and 
questioning the distribution of the profits of their labor. In turn, state and federal 
politicians are beginning to respond to these issues both on their own terms and, 
more significantly, by thinking more broadly about the fundamental structure of 
corporate governance. 
At the same time, the intellectual foundations of the modern corporation 
continue to disintegrate. The law-and-economics justifications for some of the 
core features of the modern corporation—the shareholder primacy norm and the 
exclusive shareholder franchise—have been exposed. Those arguments, it turns 
out, are based on flawed assumptions about the nature of shareholder 
preferences, misapply basic social choice theory, and are often inconsistent with 
some of the fundamental precepts of standard economics that are purported to 
support them. Their proponents are now at the point where they are unwilling to 
defend these arguments and yet strangely reluctant to abandon them, choosing 
instead to continue to rely on them without comment. The way we have 
constructed the modern corporation is under a great deal of pressure, from within 
and without.  
As we are forced to move away from the existing corporate order, we need 
to acknowledge the shortcomings (and the strengths) of its intellectual 
framework and begin to develop new models of firm governance. In this Article, 
we have cataloged the arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise and, 
one by one, found them lacking, usually on their own terms. We then presented 
a new model of corporate governance that builds on eighty years of research into 
the nature of the firm and finds further support in a new theory of democratic 
participation that ensures the proper aggregation of constituent preferences 
through accurate and manageable markers. In sum, this article sets out the 
intellectual framework that will allow investors, employees, and policymakers 
to navigate the collapse of the shareholder primacy norm and, at the same time, 
provides a positive argument for the inclusion of workers in the future of 
corporate governance.  
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